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INTRODUCTION
One of the most peculiar popular reactions during the health care
reform debate of 2009 was the repeated assertion from many senior citizens
that they did not want "government-provided health care," accompanied in
virtually the same breath by a vociferous warning to politicians to "keep
your hands off my Medicare."' The perception that Medicare is something
other than government-provided health care indicates the political strength
of the earnings-based entitlement and contributory payroll tax financing for
Medicare and Social Security. These beneficiaries clearly feel that
Medicare coverage belongs to them-is something they worked for, is
something they have some sort of ownership interest in, and is not really
provided by the government.2 This public sense of individual ownership
does not attach to other government programs, whether it be national
defense or the interstate highway system, despite the fact that all are
supported by taxes paid by Americans in one setting or another.
This singular view of Social Security and Medicare might seem bizarre
to tax analysts who consider the Social Security payroll tax, or Federal
Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) tax, to be not just one source of overall
government revenue but also an inequitable, or at least unwise, one,
primarily because it applies the same tax rate to all levels of earnings, and
to a lesser extent because it taxes only the lower part of those earnings-up
to the contribution and benefit base (limited to $106,800 in earnings for
2010).3 Given the uneven economic impact of the tax system supporting
1. See, e.g., Carolyn Lochhead, Overhaul Must Be Fully Funded, Not Worsen Deficits, Obama
Says, S.F. CHRON.,July 25, 2009, at Al ("Obama shot back against complaints that he is
leading the nation to 'government-run health care,' calling such complaints part of an
'ancient ideological battle' that ignores the fact that 60 percent of Americans already receive
government-provided health care under Medicare, Medicaid and veterans' benefits."); Bob
Moos, Medicare Changes Coming into Focus as Health Care Overhaul Moves Fonard,
DALLASNEIVS.COM, Oct. 18, 2009,
http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/news/healthscience/stories/ 101809dnbusmedi
care.4472819.html ("Ender said she was flabbergasted this summer when she heard seniors
and others vehemently oppose any 'public option' insurance plan, but at the same time
demand that lawmakers keep their hands off Medicare. 'Don't they realize that the
traditional Medicare program is public insurance?' she said.").
2. See, e.g., Posting of Bob Cesca to The Huffington Post,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bob-cesca/get-your-goddamn-govemme-b_252326.html
(Aug. 5, 2009, 06:45 EST) ("Another argument I've heard, by the way, is that seniors and
veterans have earned their socialist health care. To which I usually respond: I see. So socialized
health care is a rewardfor ajob well done? Can I quote you?').
3. See, e.g., THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., INCREASING THE
SOCIAL SECURITY PAYROLL TAX BASE: OrTIONs AND EFFECTS ON TAX BURDENS (2009);
MELISSA M. FAvREAULT & GORDON B. T. MERMIN, URBAN INST., ARE THERE
OPPORTUNITIES TO INCREASE SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRESsIvrrY DESPITE
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these programs, it may seem odd that the public has not developed the
same phobia toward the payroll tax that it seems to have toward the
income tax, much the fairer tax by most standards. Most "non-expert"
taxpayers have little complaint about the FICA tax rate being essentially a
flat tax (although most would of course prefer it to be a lower rate);
however, the wage base limit or "tax cap" is widely excoriated by taxpayers
as extremely unfair. In their eyes, it is plainly unjust that the wealthiest
taxpayers pay no more in FICA taxes than someone earning just at the
wage base. 4
This sense of unfairness has likely been exacerbated over the last two
decades of stagnant real-wage growth, coupled with increasing income and
wage inequality.5 Each year, the FICA contribution and benefit base
reflects a decreasing percentage of wages in the national economy, despite
the automatic indexing provision that raises the base limit each year
according to increases in average wages. The goal of indexing is to keep
about 90% of wages in the economy within the limit and therefore part of
the base for benefit accrual and FICA taxation, but the current provision
has proved unequal to the challenge.6
The most recent worldwide economic crisis has created a new context
for an old argument, as shrinking payrolls from higher unemployment are
temporarily reducing near-term Social Security surpluses. Tax analysts,
political commentators, and some members of Congress have variously
called for payroll tax holidays to stimulate the economy, for different ways
UNDERFUNDING? (2008); Thomas L. Hungerford, How Increasing the Payroll Tax Base Affects
Tax Burdens, 115 TAx NOTES 643, 644-46 (2007); MartinJ. McMahon,Jr., The Matthew Effect
and Federal Taxation, 45 B.C. L. REv. 993, 1025-26 (2004).
4. Recent polling data indicates that 8 3% of Americans support elimination of the
Social Security tax cap "so that workers earning more than [$106,800] would pay Social
Security tax on their entire salary just like everyone else." VIRGINIA P. RENO & JONI
LAVERY, NAT'L ACAD. OF Soc. INS., EcoNoMIC CRISIS FUELS SUPPORT FOR SOCIAL
SECURITY: AMERICANS' VIEWS ON SOCIAL SECURITY 13 (2009),
http://www.nasi.org/sites/default/files/research/EconomicCrisisFuelsSupport forSoc
ialSecurity.pdf.
5. See, e.g., Kyle Mudry & Justin Bryan, Individual Income Tax Rates and Shares, 2006,
STAT. INCOME BULL., Winter 2009, at 5, 12, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
soi/09winbulinincome.pdf (stating that despite three years of tax rate increases, the rate paid
by the top 1% decreased); Justin Bryan, Individual Income Tax Returns, 2006, STAT. INCOME
BULL., Fall 2008, at 5, 10, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/08fallbulintax.pdf
(discussing that "[flor 2006, average tax rates increased for each income category as incomes
went up to AGI of $5 million or less," but that the average tax rate for income categories
above $5 million decreased); Scott Hollenbeck & Maureen Keenan Kahr, Niney rears of
Individual Income & Tax Statistics, 1916-2005, STAT. INCOME BULL., Winter 2008, at 136, 144
tbl. 1, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irssoi/16-05intax.pdf.
6. See infra notes 80-85.
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to finance Social Security that would lessen the tax pressure on
employment, and ultimately, for wholesale reductions in program benefits
to reduce long-term costs of Social Security.7 Even before the depth and
breadth of the financial crisis was fully realized, however, the issue of Social
Security's possible long-term financing shortfall, and the use of wage-base-
limit increases to address it, was raised during the presidential campaign of
2008.
As a candidate, President Obama suggested resolving at least part of the
possible long-term financing problems for Social Security by raising the
contribution and benefit base limit for some taxpayers.8 Details are a bit
fuzzy, but generally the idea was to raise or eliminate the base only for
workers with earnings in excess of $250,000, thus creating a gap-a
"doughnut hole," so to speak-of no additional FICA tax liability for
workers with earnings above the current-indexed base-set at $106,800 for
7. See, e.g., Hendrik Hertzberg, Not Insane, NEW YORKER,
Mar. 23, 2009, at 23-24, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2009/03/23/090323taco-talkhertzberg
(noting that pundit David Frum and Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell support a
payroll-tax holiday); Kimberly Palmer, David Walker Explains Social Security's Future,
U.S.NEWS.COM, June 16, 2009, http://www.usnews.com/money/personal-
finance/articles/2009/06/ 16/david-walker-explains-social-securitys-future.html (quoting
the former U.S. Comptroller General suggesting, "We should consider adding on top [of
Social Security] a supplement-an automatic individual savings account.").
8. See Jason Furman & Austan Goolsbee, Op-Ed., The Obama Tax Plan, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 14, 2008, at A13, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121867201724238901.html (noting that Obama was
considering plans that would ask individuals making over $250,000 to pay more in total
payroll taxes); Senator Barack Obama, Remarks at the AARP Life@50+ National Expo
(Sept. 6, 2008),
http://www.barackobama.com/2008/09/06/remarks-of senator barack-obam-70.php
[hereinafter Obama Remarks] (proposing to cut and eliminate taxes for working families
and seniors); Foon Rhee, Candidates Offer Social Securitp Plans, BOSTON GLOBE,June 14, 2008,
at A5, available at http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2008/06/14/
candidates_offer_social-security-plans/. The proposal was modified in mid-August of 2008
to take effect much later, in 2017, which matches the point at which Social Security
expenditures are estimated to begin exceeding total yearly revenues. BD. OF TRUSTEES,
FED. OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INS. AND FED. DISABIuTY INS. TRUST FUNDS, THE 2008
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS
INSURANCE AND FEDERAL DisABIrTY INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS 18 (2008),
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR08/tr08.pdf [hereinafter 2008 BD. OF TRUSTEES
REPORT]. The 2009 Trustees Report now indicates that expenses will exceed revenue
beginning in 2016. BD. OF TRUSTEES, FED. OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INS. AND FED.
DISABILTY INS. TRUST FUNDS, THE 2009 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES
OF THE FEDERAL OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE AND FEDERAL DISABILTY
INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS (2009), http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/2009/tr9.pdf
[hereinafter 2009 BD. OF TRUSTEES REPORT].
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2010-but below $250,000.9 The political attraction of this proposal is
fairly obvious-it addresses the aforementioned popular notion of the
unfairness of the FICA "wage cap" and also fulfills the President's
campaign promise to not raise taxes on anyone making less than $250,000
per year. Little has been heard about the proposal since the election, and it
is unclear whether it will see the light of day in any future Obama
Administration proposals for Social Security. Nonetheless, the suggestion
provides an opening for examination of the contribution and benefit base
with fresh eyes.
Arguments about the general concept of a tax base have most often
focused on the notion of a "comprehensive tax base" and, more recently,
on whether we should tax consumption as a base, rather than income.' 0
Whatever the criteria for the "best" tax system are-efficiency, social
welfare, distribution of tax burden, etc.-the debates frequently center on
the question of the appropriate definition of the tax base: what exactly
should be taxed, no matter what kind of rate is assessed? If income is to be
taxed, the inevitable next inquiry is what constitutes income and how
comprehensive that definition should be." If consumption is to be taxed,
the first inquiry, before addressing the appropriate rate level, is likely to be
what kinds of consumption should be exempt in order to prevent the tax
from imposing too onerous a burden on the most vulnerable segments of
9. See Soc. Sec. Admin., Contribution and Benefit Base,
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/COLA/cbb.html (last visited Apr. 26. 2010). Interestingly, it
appears that the "doughnut hole" feature originated with the campaign of John Edwards
when he was still in the race for the Democratic nomination. Teddy Davis, Obama Floats
Social Security Tax Hike, ABCNEWS.COM, Sept. 22, 2007,
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/Story?id=3638710&page=1 (quoting Edwards as saying,
"I do think we need to have a bubble above $97,000, probably up to about $200,000, so we
don't raise taxes on middle-class families. .. . But, above the $200,000, these millionaires on
Wall Street ought to be paying their Social Security taxes").
10. See, e.g., Deborah A. Geier, The Taxation ofIncome Available for Discretionary Use, 25 VA.
TAX REV. 765, 767 (2006) ("The signature tax policy tension of the last two decades (at least)
has been whether the federal tax base ought to reach 'income' or only 'consumption");
Edward J. McCaffery, A New Understanding of Tax, 103 MICH. L. REV. 807, 920-38 (2005)
(arguing for a progressive postpaid consumption task as a way to implement a fair timing of
taxation); Daniel Shaviro, Beyond the Pro-Consumption Tax Consensus, 60 STAN. L. REV. 745,
746-47 (2007) ("In the last ten or so years, [the tax policy debate] has increasingly come to
denote instead replacing the income tax with a consumption tax.").
11. For a more recent discussion on the comprehensive tax base, see David A.
Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955
(2004). As those authors note, several seminal works on the topic include Boris I. Bittker, A
"Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HARv. L. REV. 925 (1967); R.A.
Musgrave, In Defense of an Income Concept, 81 HARv. L. REV. 44 (1967); and Joseph A.
Pechman, Comprehensive Income Taxation: A Comment, 81 HARV. L. REV. 63 (1967).
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society.12
Much less attention has been paid in tax theory debates to the Social
Security contribution and benefit base, even though many American
workers pay more in payroll taxes than income taxes each year.13 True,
economists and tax analysts have repeatedly criticized the FICA tax for its
regressivity, but the range of analysis is limited mainly to the economic
impact of a tax on wages, with less consideration of what the base itself
should look like from any other policy perspective.' 4 What is different
about the Social Security payroll contributions and earnings-based benefit
system that leads analysts to marginalize it in the bigger picture of tax
analysis?
Three elements of the FICA contribution and benefit base in particular
differentiate it from other tax bases: (1) the inclusion of only wages, not
other sorts of income, in the base;' 5 (2) the dollar limit that results in
inclusion of less than 100% of all wages in the base; and (3) the use of the
same base for both benefits earned and contributions paid. Perhaps the last
element is the major reason the Social Security contribution and benefit
base has remained essentially unchanged in structure for seventy years: it is
part of a closed system that both requires revenues from a special levy to be
dedicated to a single spending purpose and ties those expenditures to
earnings recorded under the same limited tax system.' 6 The FICA
structure's purpose is not simply to raise revenue but also to provide a
method of financing that echoes the values underlying the system for old-
12. See McCaffery, supra note 10, at 812 (suggesting that a postpaid consumption tax is
the "fairest and least arbitrary" tax system because it "burdens some but not all uses of
capital and its yield, and for normatively attractive reasons").
13. See ANDREW CHAMBERLAIN & GERALD PRANTE, TAx FOUND., WHICH TAXES
WEIGH MOST HEAVILY ON AMERICANS WITH DIFFERENT INCOMES?, (2007),
http://www.taxfoundation.org/files/ffBO.pdf ("On average, federal payroll taxes per
household actually outweighed personal income taxes in 2004-$7,069 per household
compared to $7,062.").
14. See, e.g., CITIZENS FOR TAx JUSTICE, AN ANALYSIS OF ELIMINATING THE CAP ON
EARNINGS SUBJECT TO THE SOCIAL SECURITY TAx & RELATED ISSUES 3-4 (2006),
http://www.ctj.org/pdf/socialsecuritytaxeamingscapnov2006.pdf (suggesting expanding the
Social Security tax base to adjusted gross income).
15. Of course, most dedicated taxes are applied to a specific kind of income and
expenditure-for example, the Highway Trust Fund is financed by federal gasoline taxes.
26 U.S.C. § 9503 (2006).
16. See, e.g., Charles Krauthammer, Op-Ed., Forget 2042-7he Real Crisis for Social
Security Comes in 13 Years, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Feb. 19, 2005, at A-10 (stressing that
the Social Security system is "pay-as-you-go"); Robert Novak, Op-Ed., McCain Could Score
Big with Payroll Tax Cut, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 27, 2008, at 19 ("[T]he heavy payroll tax
revenues not only provide enough money for Social Security but fund other programs, as
well.").
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age income benefits: those who work for a lifetime are the ones who earn
entitlement to benefits.
Payroll-tax financing has made Social Security's revenue flow less
susceptible to political manipulation precisely because it is part of this
closed system, which includes an internal savings mechanism in the form of
yearly surpluses retained and held as dedicated government bonds to be
used to pay benefits whenever yearly revenues may fall short.' 7 The flip
side of this stability, however, is that the entire system becomes the target of
political attacks in any year payroll-tax revenues are projected to fall short
of projected yearly benefit payments, even when trust-fund reserves are
adequate for decades to bridge any financing gaps.' 8 In addition, the
unified contribution and benefit structure seems to restrict, and possibly
distort, thinking on options for changing the system's financing to meet
changing economic circumstances.' 9
Current calls for "reform" of Social Security have little to do with any
generally perceived need for change in the way the program delivers
benefits. Rather, the limitations of payroll tax financing and the current
wage base have created an opening for budget hawks and longtime
opponents of Social Security to argue that the program must be targeted
for reductions to address the federal deficit.20 I suggest that the limits of the
17. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 401(a) (2006) (establishing a Federal Old-Age and Survivors
Insurance Trust Fund); 42 U.S.C. § 1395i(a) (2006) (creating a Federal Hospital Insurance
Trust Fund); 2009 BD. OF TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 8, at 2 (reporting that the trust
funds to support Social Security are adequately financed for the next twenty-five years, but
that the combined funds are projected to become exhausted in 2037).
18. See Lori Montgomery, Lawmakers Seeking Consensus on Social Securio Overhaul, WASH.
POST, May 6, 2009, at A14 (describing potential negotiations between both political parties
regarding major changes to Social Security).
19. See AARP PUB. POLICY INST., REFORM OPTIONS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY 6-7
(2008), http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/econ/i3-reform.pdf (discussing that trust-fund asset
returns could be increased by investing in nongovernment securities.) See also Letter from
David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the U.S., to Rep. Bill Thomas, Chairman,
Comm. on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives (May 6, 2005),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05649r.pdf (outlining options for social security reform,
including tapping different revenue streams and increasing investment returns through
broader investing and individual accounts).
20. The recent creation of the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and
Reform by President Obama is seen by many as a result of pressure by long-time "deficit
hawks" to focus on cuts in Social Security and Medicare as a primary way to address the
national debt. See, e.g., Posting of James Ridgeway to Mother Jones,
http://motherjones.com/mojo/2010/02/obamas-stealth-entitlement-commission (Feb. 19,
2010, 00:33 PST); see also Posting of John D. McKinnon to Washington Wire,
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2010/02/18/left-and-right-take-aim-at-alan-simpson/
(Feb. 18, 2010, 18:20 EST) (discussing former Sen. Alan Simpson, named co-chair of the
commission, and his history of supporting dramatic cuts in Social Security); Posting of Dean
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current base and payroll-tax system do not mean that the very necessary
benefit system is too expensive but rather that we should examine other
ways to increase dedicated revenues to fully fund the system if the current
system's revenues fall short at some point. The problem is not that benefits
are too generous-far from it-but rather that revenues are falling short of
system needs.2 ' In contrast to the problems of Medicare and the health
system generally, the costs of the Social Security cash-benefit system have
not exceeded expectations (the number of baby boomers reaching
retirement age beginning in 2005 was essentially known from the time of
their births, after all), but payroll-tax income has not kept pace with
expenditures.2 2
If we are to think creatively about how to resolve any future financing
issues for Social Security, it is critical to bear in mind that while the right to
benefits is earned individually, benefits are paid for on a social basis. The
amount of payroll taxes collected from or on behalf of any individual
worker has nothing to do with her eventual benefit entitlement. 23 The
payroll tax is a group-financing mechanism, not an individual investment
or payment for individual benefits, and in fact is not the sole source of
revenue for the program.24 It is often overlooked in debates over Social
Baker to TPMCaf6, http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/2010/02/17/alan-simpson
a_man who intensely-.wants tocutsoci/ (Feb. 17, 2010, 04:41 EST).
21. For a clear demonstration of how low Social Security benefits are, see PATRICIA E.
DILLEY, NAT'L AcAD. OF Soc. INS., RESTORING OLD AGE INCOME SECURITY FOR Low-
WAGE SINGLE WORKERS, (2009), http://www.nasi.org/sites/default/files/research/
PatriciaDilleyJanuary_2009_Rockefeller.pdf.
22. The average Social Security benefit payable to retired workers inJanuary 2009 was
$1,153 per month. See Soc. Sec. Admin., Find an Answer to Your Question, http://ssa-
custhelp.ssa.gov/cgi-bin/ssa.cfg/php/enduser/std-adp.php?p-faqid=310 (last visited May
8, 2010). For a discussion of the system's financing arc in the future, see 2009 BD. OF
TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 8, at 2 (predicting that the annual cost of Social Security will
begin to exceed tax income in 2016 and that the system will become insolvent in 2037).
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(a) (2006) (stating that every fully insured individual who has
attained age 62 and filed an application for benefits "shall be entitled to an old-age
insurance benefit for each month" beginning with the first month in which that individual
has reached retirement age and ending with the month preceding the month of his death);
id. § 414(a) (defining the term fully insured individual as anyone with the required number of
quarters of coverage, normally forty, by the time of application for benefits); id. § 413
(defining quarter ofcoverage for years before 1978 as a calendar quarter in which the individual
was paid $50 or more in wages, and for years after 1977, "each portion of the total of the
wages paid and self-employment income credited" that equals the amount required for a
quarter of coverage that year).
24. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., SOCIAL SECURITY: UNDERSTANDING THE BENEFITS 6-9 (2010),
available at http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/10024.pdf (explaining the breakdown of paying into
the system and receiving benefits out of the system). See 2009 BD. OF TRUSTEES REPORT,
supra note 817, at 37 (noting that financial securities produce another stream of revenue).
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Security's future financial path that the original designers did not
contemplate a payroll tax as the primary financing mechanism at all, and
certainly not once the program reached maturity. Indeed, substantial
revenues from nonpayroll-tax sources have long been part of the total
financing of the system.25
For example, the Social Security trust funds receive general income tax
revenues representing the federal government's employer share of payroll
taxes for federal employees covered by Social Security as well as the
revenues realized from taxation of Social Security benefits received by
higher income beneficiaries. 26 Both of these revenue sources represent a
further socialization of the costs of Social Security over all taxpayers,
unassociated with any individual taxpayer's benefit accrual. This is not to
say the contributory principle is unimportant, but focusing on the
difference between earning benefits individually and paying for them as a
society may yield some fresh insights on how the concept of the
contribution and benefit base might be productively redesigned.
The heart of the matter is the very nature and basis for entitlement to
Social Security benefits-the prevailing assumption that workers become
entitled to benefits because they pay for that coverage through payroll taxes
is simply wrong, both as a matter of philosophical principle and of law.
Entitlement to Social Security benefits is attained by working, not by
paying taxes, in keeping with the program's fundamental premise that all
those who work for most or all of their lives are entitled to at least basic
income security in their old age. The distinction is not mere semantics:
separating entitlement based on effort from financing needs is a critical step
to developing more flexible and equitable solutions to future financing
problems, beginning with a fresh look at the contribution and benefit base
limit.
The President's wage-base proposal has created an opportunity for a
wholesale reimagining of the base limit. Beyond any specific merits or
drawbacks this proposal might have, it serves as a convenient starting point
for an exploration of the notion of the contribution and benefit base
primarily from a Social Security programmatic perspective. The President
has recently reiterated his support for increases in the contribution and
benefit base to resolve, in whole or in part, any long-term or short-term
financing issues for Social Security, but there may be equally compelling
25. 2009 BD. OF TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 8, at 37.
26. See 26 U.S.C. § 86(a)-(b) (2006) (providing for taxation of Social Security benefits
for beneficiaries in designated higher income brackets); Social Security Act Amendments of
1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 121(e), 97 Stat. 65, 83-84 (requiring that the amount of revenues
equivalent to the "aggregate increase in tax liabilities" attributable to taxation of Social
Security benefits be appropriated at least quarterly to the Social Security trust funds).
375
ADMLNISTRA TIVE LA WREVIEW
reasons to raise the base or change its calculations whether or not Social
Security ultimately requires additional financing.27
Part I of this Article explores the original design of the Social Security
contribution and benefit base as part of its benefit and financing system in
an attempt to understand why a wage tax was chosen as the financing
mechanism, why a limit was placed on the wages and earnings that would
count, and why both benefits and taxes are tied to the same base. One
reason for the muddled discussion of raising the wage base is perhaps the
lack of understanding of its origins and function in Social Security; the
frequent appeals for fidelity to "original principles" are too often based on
either extremely sketchy knowledge of or thinly disguised hostility to the
actual basic principles of social insurance generally and of the U.S. Social
Security system in particular.
Part II discusses the current configuration of the contribution and benefit
base, which is widely perceived as unfair by the people whose wages are
entirely covered by it, in the context of Social Security program principles
as well as of tax policy. The contribution and benefit base limit has been
increased on an ad hoc basis many times throughout the history of the
program-most recently by a schedule of increases enacted as part of the
1977 Social Security Amendments, the last of which occurred in 1992 (the
schedule was accelerated in the 1983 Social Security Amendments). 28
Currently, the dollar limit of the base is indexed to the increase in average
wages each year, so the question is whether there is any programmatic basis
for increasing the dollar amount further, increasing it only for workers with
27. See Soc. SEC. ADMIN., UPDATE 2010 (2010),
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/pubs/10003.pdf (showing that the 2010 wage base has not
been stepped up from that of 2009). For the President's continued support for increasing the
wage base to address long-term Social Security financing, see President Barack Obama,
Townhall in Henderson, Nevada (Feb. 19, 2010), in REALCLEARPoUTics.coM,
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2010/02/19/obamas townhall_inhenderson-n
evada_104485.html. In response to a question on Social Security, the President suggests,
So what we've said is, well,. . . doesn't it make sense to maybe have that payroll tax
[base] cut off at a higher level, or have people-maybe you hold people harmless till
they make $250,000 a year, but between $250,000 and a million or something, they
start paying payroll tax again-just to make sure that the fund overall is solvent....
That's not the only way of fixing it, but if you made a slight adjustment like that, then
Social Security would be there well into the future and it would be fine.
Id. A brief disclaimer: I will not be discussing the Medicare program, although I will
address, for comparison's sake, the Medicare portion of the FICA tax (since 1984, 1.45% of
the 7.65% total) and the elimination in 1993 of the wage base for that portion.
28. See Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, § 101, 91 Stat. 1509,
1510-12 (increasing the tax rates to offset deficit); § 331, 91 Star. at 1541-42 (reducing
benefit increases); Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 101, 97 Stat.
65, 67-70 (changing coverage for newly hired federal employees).
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earnings greater than a certain level, or eliminating the limit altogether.
The importance of the contributory principle to the Social Security
program is undeniable, but it is unclear that the present level of the base for
both benefits and taxes is completely consistent with program goals or with
at least some definitions of tax fairness.
Part III uses the doughnut hole proposal as a starting point for
examination of possible alternatives to simply raising the contribution and
benefit base beyond the indexed increases already provided under current
law. A host of enforcement and tax-equity issues are obviously raised by
the idea of increasing or eliminating the wage base only for high-wage
workers, but I focus mainly on the question of whether there is a coherent
basis in Social Security program theory for anything like a doughnut hole
wage-base configuration. Even if the proposal is never revived by the
Obama Administration, examination of the reactions to it is useful in
revealing both the political agendas and the lack of understanding of Social
Security on the part of many of its critics. Ultimately, the primary
objection to a doughnut hole structure may be practical rather than
theoretical: Congress may have learned some hard lessons from the
reactions to the legislated coverage gap in the Medicare prescription-drug
plan about being careful when creating gaps in either tax or benefit
structures that may have unintended consequences leading to uncertainty,
anger, and gamesmanship behavior in taxpayers.29 The distributional and
political results may not be worth the accompanying static.
While the doughnut hole proposal might create as many problems as it
would solve, it does suggest that the time may be right to redesign the
concept of the wage base to raise additional revenue for Social Security and
achieve the desired distributional results without invoking the notion of a
gap in taxation at all. These solutions will require reexamination of actual,
as opposed to politically distorted, fundamental principles of Social
Security. This is not simply a question of efficient and fair tax policy: it is
essential to consider how changing or eliminating the limit on the base, or
decoupling the contribution base from the benefit base after a certain wage
or income level, would affect the function and political viability of Social
Security and the payroll tax. Payroll-tax financing, both the fixed rate and
the automatically indexed wage base, provides political strength and
29. See, e.g., Robert Pear, Medicare Beneficiaries Confused and Ang y over Gap in Drug Coverage,
N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2006, at A14, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/30/washington/30medicare.html?_r=1 &ex= 11544048
00&en=584f50d7ee778a42&ei=5087%0OA ("The gap, the notorious 'doughnut hole,' is
upsetting many beneficiaries, and it has become a potent symbol as politicians debate the
merits of the new program.").
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certainty to Social Security but also imposes rigidity and lack of flexibility in
the face of changing economic conditions.
Part IV analyzes some possibilities for reimagining and reformulating the
current contribution and benefit base, mainly focusing on the notion of
decoupling the tax base for financing purposes from the earnings base for
benefit-accrual purposes while still retaining the contributory principle that
has traditionally been the foundation of Social Security's widespread public
support across income and class lines. While the contributory financing
system, as discussed below in Part I, is an integral element of the political
economy of Social Security, there may be no compelling rationale for
continuing to largely restrict the program's financing to payroll tax
revenues.
Some critics of proposals to raise the base for contributions but not for
benefit calculations have charged that such a separation would violate a
fundamental principle of the earned entitlement of social insurance.30 The
same objection is also frequently raised against suggestions for partial
financing of Social Security from non-FICA, general-tax-revenue sources,
despite the fact that it already receives substantial nonpayroll-tax revenues.
For reasons I discuss below, I think these criticisms are overstated and
frequently based on a misunderstanding of the role of the contribution and
benefit base in the Social Security program. The more serious objections to
any separation of the base for benefits from the base for taxes are political,
having to do with public support for the program, which may or may not
be grounded in an accurate understanding of program principles. There
are valid political as well as substantive policy points against increasing the
wage base without increasing the benefit base, but it is not an open-and-
shut case.
Much of the resistance to the idea of expanding partial general-tax-
revenue financing is connected to the fear of the political consequences of
loosening the bonds between contributory financing and the earned right to
a benefit. The erroneous notion, exploited by conservative opponents of
the program, that Social Security benefits are an individual investment
rather than an earned right to a portion of the future productivity of society
as a whole has hampered creative approaches to financing that would
equalize the tax burden by requiring more from the upper-income
.taxpayers who benefit disproportionately from the economic and social
stability that Social Security underwrites.
There is a strong case for leaving the wage base essentially unchanged
30. See, e.g., Mickey Kaus, Obama's "Mission Accomplished": What His New Faux-Presidential
Seal Symbolizes, SLATE, June 21, 2008, http://www.slate.com/id/2193674/#bigdonut
(describing reactions to proposed Social Security reforms).
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for the time being, a decision President Obama appears to have reached
during the campaign when he suggested a 2019 effective date for his base
increase proposal.3' The larger issue that hangs over any discussion of
changes to the Social Security base for policymakers, if not for tax theorists,
is whether or when the system will need additional payroll-tax revenue to
fully finance benefits as required by current law.32 The flurry of interest at
the 2009 White House Fiscal Responsibility Summit in "fixing Social
Security" demonstrates the tenacity of the belief in the need to overfinance
current Social Security benefits in order to secure the program's financial
future thirty years from now.33 However, depending on how one views the
possibility that future congresses or presidential administrations would fail
to honor the Treasury's obligations to redeem Social Security bonds and
provide the cash necessary to fully pay benefits, there is a strong argument
that there is no need to talk about increasing the contribution and benefit
base or any other aspect of the payroll taxes right now, or at least to have
any such increase go into effect any time soon.34
At the heart of continuing discussion of raising revenue now or years or
even decades before the system actually needs any additional cash to pay
benefits is the chimera of advance funding, a goal that runs counter to the
fundamental "pay as you go" financing structure of the program.3 5 The
31. See Larry Kudlow, One-on-One with Austan Goolsbee, Obama's Econ Man, CNBC.coM,
Aug. 28, 2008, http://www.cnbc.com/id/26441455 (noting that the marginal rate would
increase to 3 9 .6 % in "2019 at the earliest"); see also Furman & Goolsbee, supra note 8
(detailing Obama's suggestions for changing Social Security).
32. For a discussion of the possible effects of the current economic crisis on Social
Security's financial stability, see Robert Greenstein, President, Ctr. on Budget & Policy
Priorities, Remarks at the Fiscal Responsibility Summit (Feb. 23, 2009),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/blog/Fiscal Responsibility Summit Report.pdf; see also
The Economic Outlook and Budget Challenges: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on the Budget, I 11th
Cong. 44-49 (2009) (statement of Alice M. Rivlin, Ph.D, Senior Fellow, Brookings
Institution).
33. See Joe Conason, Reform Healthcare-and Leave Social Security Alone, SALON, Feb. 23,
2009, http://www.salon.com/opinion/conason/2009/02/23/fiscal-responsibility
summit/ (arguing that the Administration should leave entitlement programs alone as
Social Security will "be solvent on its own for decades to come").
34. See generally 2009 BD. OF TRUSTEEs REPORT, supra note 8.
35. For example, at a presidential campaign event in July 2008,John McCain attacked
"pay-as-you-go" claiming that "Americans have got to understand that we are paying
present-day retirees with the taxes paid by young workers in America today. And that's a
disgrace. It's an absolute disgrace, and it's got to be fixed." Larry Robter, The Candidates
Speak Off the Cuff and Trouble Quickly Follows, N.Y. TIMES,July 11, 2008, at Al5. Of course, it
is clear that pay-as-you-go financing is not a new phenomenon but rather was the intention
since the program's inception. As the Committee on Economic Security noted, "Expressed
differently, the plan we advocate amounts to having each generation pay for the support of
the people then living who are old." COMM. ON EcoN. SEC., REPORT OF THE COMMITEE
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suggestion that Social Security needs more immediate revenue is a political
question, not a programmatic or even tax-policy question, and the fact that
Social Security financing is being discussed at all right now represents a
victory of propaganda over analysis and a fundamental misunderstanding
of Social Security itself.
I. ORIGIN AND PURPOSE OF THE WAGE BASE LIMIT
The Social Security program-in the very limited original form of the
Old Age Insurance-was initially enacted in 1935 as a response to the
widespread financial crisis caused by the collapse of the international
financial system, which severely shook both stock markets and financial
institutions. The general economic effects of the crash and of the Great
Depression in the 1930s affected almost all Americans, but the impact on
the elderly was concentrated and devastating: their savings were lost when
banks crashed, their pensions, for the lucky few who had any, were likely to
have dried up, and their children, hit hard with lost employment, were
much less able to help fill in economic gaps or even provide them a place to
live. 36 It was impossible to claim that poverty and economic desperation
were a result of individual shiftless or spendthrift behavior when economic
collapse left at least a quarter of working-age men unemployed and
essentially penniless.37 A social response to a societal economic collapse was
ON EcoNOMIC SECURITY (1935), reprinted in Economic Securiy Act. Hearing on HR. 4120 Before
the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 74th Cong. 45 (1935),
http://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/ces5.html [hereinafter CES REPORT].
36. The Depression's impact, declared economist Paul H. Douglas in 1936,
"increasingly convinced the majority of the American people that individuals could not by
themselves provided adequately for their old age and that some form of greater security
should be provide by society." PAUL H. DOUGLAS, SOCIAL SECURITY IN AMERICA 6-7
(1936). "The Depression deprived millions of older workers ofjobs; it seemed unlikely that
they would ever reenter the labor force." W. ANDREW ACHENBAUM, SOCIAL SECURITY:
VISIONS AND REVISIONS 16 (1986). "A Massachusetts Census for Unemployment (1934)
indicated an overall unemployment rate of 2 5. 2 %; the percentages for those aged sixty to
sixty-four and sixty-five to sixty-nine were 27.2% and 29 .8 %, respectively." Id. at 201 n.21
(citing INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH DEP'T, UNIv. OF PA. WHARTON SCH. OF FIN. AND
COMMERCE, UNEMPLOYMENT IN PHILADELPHIA FAMILIES, APRIL, 1931, at 20 (spec. rep. no.
1-8, 1931) and Herman B. Byer, Employment Conditions and Unemployment Relief 43 MONTHLY
LAB. REv. 1150, 1157-61 (1936)). Firms were unable to honor pension obligations and
savings were lost. See id. at 16-17. "By 1934, over half of the elderly in America were
impoverished.... Records of almshouses in 121 urban areas revealed that between 1929
and the end of 1933, the populations in those institutions jumped by almost 75 percent."
NANCY J. ALTMAN, THE BATTLE FOR SOCIAL SECURITY: FROM FDR's VISION To BUSH'S
GAM4BLE 23 (2005).
37. See ACHENBAUM, supra note 36, at 16 (noting that the Depression posed a threat to
everyone's futures and therefore the public became "more responsive to the problems of
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required.
Social Security was thus born out of economic necessity, but not as an
instrument of immediate poor relief, which was the purpose of a different
program altogether.38  The primary objective of Social Security,
particularly in the form that finally took effect after the 1939 fundamental
revisions, was to prevent future poverty in old age for workers who had
spent a lifetime working, as well as for their spouses or surviving spouses.39
It is important to keep this focus in mind when examining the financing
mechanism of the payroll tax and the limitations of the wage base.
When the Roosevelt Administration sent Congress the original set of
proposals that became the Social Security Act of 1935, the Old Age
Insurance program was proposed to be financed through mandatory
contributions from employees and an equivalent excise tax that employers
would pay on employee earned wages, but there was no specific limit on the
wages subject to the levy.40 However, while manual laborers would be
covered regardless of their level of earnings, workers earning more than
$3,000 per year in nonmanual labor were exempt from coverage under the
system. 4 1 The House Ways and Means Committee included the concept of
the contribution and benefit base in its version of the legislation, expanding
the number of workers covered to reach all workers in industrial or service
work but limiting the "contribution and benefit base" to $3,000 per year.
Thus, workers making more than that base figure would have essentially
partial Social Security benefit accrual and taxation, as is the case today.42
those growing older").
38. The Social Security Act of 1935 instituted the "Grants to States for Old-Age
Assistance" program, which granted funds to each state, subject to certain requirements, to
provide financial assistance for the elderly poor. See Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No.
74-271, 49 Stat. 620, 620-22.
39. See generally H.R Doc. No. 76-110, at 1-2 (1939), available at
http://www.ssa.gov/history/fdrstmts.html#1939b.
40. Roosevelt's advisors and many of the original designers of the program considered
using general income-tax revenues rather than a dedicated wage tax to pay for Social
Security. However, the income tax would have had to be greatly expanded to working
people if it was not to be funded solely by the upper class, which then paid almost all income
taxes. This was not a viable option at a time when only the wealthy were foreseen to ever
pay income taxes and in addition would not have had Roosevelt's desired political effect of
creating an "earned entitlement" that could never be taken away from workers. See Carolyn
C. Jones, Class Tax to Mass Tax: The Role of Propaganda in the Expansion of the Income Tax During
World War 11, 37 BuFF. L. REV. 685, 689-91 (1988-89).
41. See JANEMARIE MULVEY & DEBRA B. WHITMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., SOCIAL
SECURITY: RAISING OR ELIMINATING THE TAXABLE EARNINGs BASE 1 (2008),
http://aging.senate.gov/crs/ss9.pdf (noting that only very rarely would a manual laborer
exceed $3,000 in yearly earnings at that time).
42. "The term 'wages' does not necessarily apply to the total remuneration received
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The original 1935 benefit formula was tied to the $3,000 per year base
but was to be applied to all cumulative covered earnings over the worker's
career, not counting more than $3,000 per year. 43 This version of Social
Security never actually took effect as no benefits were paid prior to the
enactment of the 1939 Amendments and the benefit structure was modified
in those amendments to be based on average, rather than cumulative,
wages up to the base44 and to be substantially more progressive as well.45
from the employer by the employee; the term includes only the first $3,000 of wages
received by an employee from his employer with respect to employment during the calendar
year." H.R. REP. No. 74-615, pt. H, at 21 (1935), available at
http://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/35housereport.html. Thus, the Committee on
Economic Security report, CES REPORT, supra note 35, focused on covering workers in low
paying jobs, as very few manual laborers would have had more than $3,000 in wages at that
time, while the House bill, which ended up being essentially what was finally enacted,
focused on covering all workers, but only wages of those workers up to a certain point. It is
interesting that the House bill was essentially more economically democratic than the
Administration's approach; covering workers who are in low-wage jobs presupposes more or
less fixed employment at that level, whereas covering all workers (or at least all workers in
industrial employment) but only earnings up to a fixed level allows for both mobility and
fluctuation in earnings levels from year to year.
43. Benefits were to be calculated at 1/2 of 1% of the first $3,000 earned plus 1/12 of
1% of the next $42,000 earned plus 1/24 of 1% of the amount earned exceeding $45,000.
See Social Security Act of 1935 § 202, 49 Stat. at 623.
44. The change from cumulative to average covered earnings as a base to which the
formula was applied was done deliberately to achieve somewhat higher ultimate benefits for
lower wage workers. See ACHENBAUM, supra note 36, at 32. In a 1938 report, the Advisory
Council on Social Security stated the following:
In addition, the Council believes that careful study should be given to the
substitution of an average wage formula for the accumulated wage formula incorporated
in the present Act. An average wage formula would more readily permit an increase
in the early benefit payments and enable eventual costs to be kept within the limits
prescribed under Recommendation II. Furthermore, in Recommendation VI the
Council is on record as approving the average wage formula for computing
survivorship benefits. By basing all benefits under Title II upon average wages,
simplicity of understanding and administration is achieved as well as a consistent and
related pattern of benefit payments.
ADvISORY COUNCIL ON Soc. SEC., REPORT OF THE 1938 ADvISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL
SECURITY TO THE SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD AND THE SENATE FINANCE COMMIT-TEE
(1938), http://www.socialsecurity.gov/history/reports/38advise.html.
45. The formula applied to the average monthly wage (AMW) was 4 0 % of the first $50
plus 10% of the next $200, with the total result increased by 1% for each year with at least
$200 of creditable wages. The result of applying that benefit formula to the AMW was the
"primary insurance amount," or PIA, and all other Social Security benefits to be paid on the
worker's account (spousal benefits, for example) were (and still are) calculated as a
percentage of PIA. See GEOFFREY KoLLMANN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., SOCIAL SECURITY:
SUMMARY OF MAJOR CHANGES IN THE CASH BENEFIT PROGRAM: 1935-1996, at 2-3
http://www.ssa.gov/history/pdf/crs9436.pdf.
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The payroll contribution made by employees and the excise tax paid by
employers was also limited by the $3,000 base and collected through wage
withholding, an innovation made necessary by the widespread coverage of
workers who for the first time were subject to a federal obligation. 46
Prior to the enactment of Social Security, the federal income tax affected
a small minority of U.S workers, almost solely those at the top end of the
income scale.47 The insistence of the designers of Social Security on direct
employee contributions to the system required a more expansive payment
mechanism than the income-tax model could provide. In addition, it
seemed important to distinguish Social Security contributions-under
FICA-from taxes and to keep the whole system as far from the IRS as
possible.48
Therefore, employers were enlisted in the cause of enforcement and
collection of FICA contributions: charged with withholding the employee
contributions and then forwarding both employee contributions and
employer shares to the Bureau of Old Age Benefits for processing.49 This
collection system had a number of effects all by itself, not least making this
contribution extremely visible to both workers and employers, and inspiring
in workers contributing to the system a sense of connection to their future
Social Security benefits.50 The early information given to workers and the
public generally about Social Security deliberately characterized the
employee share of FICA as a contribution rather than a tax to emphasize
each individual's relationship to the system and to his eventual entitlement
46. For a discussion of the innovation of wage withholding, see Joseph J. Thorndike,
Historical Perspective-The Price of Reorganization: Fewer Audits and Tax Forgiveness, Sept. 2, 2002,
TAxHISTORY.ORG, http://www.taxhistory.org/thp/readings.nsf/ArtWeb/
9A29924CO3AB9ElE85256DFE005981F9?OpenDocument ("World War II brought two
major changes to the federal tax system. First, it dramatically expanded the individual
income tax, boosting the number of taxpayers sevenfold in just six years. Second, it
introduced wage withholding to help new taxpayers meet their obligations.").
47. See Jones, supra note 40, at 689 (stating that only about 3.7% of the total population
paid federal income taxes under FDR).
48. See ACHENBAUM, supra note 36, at 28 (explaining that social security officials
released a campaign to assure American workers that "the taxes they were paying were like
insurance premiums").
49. See W. ELuoTr BROWNLEE, FUNDING THE MODERN AMERICAN STATE, 1941-1995:
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE ERA OF EASY FINANCE 92 (1996).
50. NancyJ. Altman, Social Security and the Low-Income Worker, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1139,
1152-53 (2007) ("Nevertheless, to the extent that people have made specific monetary
payments to ensure receipt of their own benefit, the moral obligation of government to
honor the promises made is much stronger than it would be otherwise. Americans
appropriately have a sense of contributing toward their own retirement and feel good about
receiving those benefits. This sense of entitlement contributes to the program's success.").
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to benefits.5'
While the general point of the first Social Security Act in its entirety was
to alleviate economic hardship for working people fallen on hard times, the
original $3,000 figure for the contribution and benefit base for the Old Age
Insurance portion of the Act was high enough to cover most American
wages even though large categories of workers were initially left out of the
system altogether. 52 Less than 10% of salaries exceeded $3,000 per year at
the time, and only 9% of the population made more than $2,500 a year in
1939, so the administration's 1935 proposal effectively covered the entire
wage of all manual laborers in industrial jobs, few of whom would make as
much as $3,000 per year, as well as most nonmanual workers in industrial
work.53 The focus was on getting people benefit coverage and only to a
lesser extent on how to pay for those benefits.54
The drafters of the 1935 House bill that set the contribution and benefit
base at $3,000, however, made an explicit decision to tie the base for
earnings covered by Social Security for benefit purposes to the base for tax
purposes.55 When that original, very limited Social Security program was
51. ALTMAN, supra note 36, at 33-34 (discussing FDR's intent that the social security
program be conceived of as an insurance program).
52. Farm workers and minority workers were especially affected. See generally Dorothy
A. Brown, Race and Class Matters in Tax Policy, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 790 (2007).
"Policymakers expected that all workers would someday participate in the old-age insurance
plan, but practical administrative and constitutional considerations persuaded them to limit
coverage at first. Roughly 9.4 million workers (including farmers, domestic servants, and
government employees) were excluded from the new program." ACHENBAUM, supra note 36,
at 23. "That most of the poorest workers--such as Southern blacks-were excluded from
coverage suggests that policymakers were willing to make politically expedient
compromises." Id.
53. REPORT OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD, H.R. Doc. No. 76-110, at 8-9 (1939),
available at http://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/38ssbadvise.html. The 1939 Census
showed that only 9% of the population made more than $2,500 per year, so clearly almost
all of the wages of those workers covered by the program were included in the contribution
and benefit base. Many categories of workers were left out of the original Act, for example,
farm laborers, so that far fewer than 90% of all workers were actually covered by the
original bill. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, POPULATION-
SPECIAL REPORTS: EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT BY WAGE OR SALARY INCOME: 1940 (1946),
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/education/p46-5/p46-5.pdf. Coverage was
greatly expanded in the 1939 Act and later legislation.
54. "In 1935, the designers of Social Security, President Franklin Roosevelt's
Committee on Economic Security, did not recommend a maximum level of taxable earnings
in its plan, and the draft bill that President Roosevelt sent to the Hill did not include one.
The bill emphasized who was to be covered by the system, not how much wages should be
taxed. Being in the midst of the Depression, the Administration's attention was on the large
number of aged people living in poverty." See MULVEY &WHITMAN, supra note 41, at 1.
55. See generally H.R. REP. No. 74-615, pt. 2, at 19-22, 29-33 (1935) (establishing a
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rewritten from the ground up in the 1939 Social Security Act Amendments
and expanded into a true social insurance program, the contribution and
benefit base was one of the few elements to carry over essentially
unchanged.56
A critical point is that neither the 1935 program nor the 1939 amended
program, which essentially established the basic program that is in
operation today, contained any direct relationship between benefits paid
out and amount of taxes paid in. It is true that the original legislation was
based on a contributory annuity model, similar to private annuities
purchased through insurance companies today, although with guaranteed
benefits based on a benefit formula applied to cumulative earnings under
the system. 57 However, that model was essentially abandoned only two
years after contributions began to be collected and before any benefits were
paid. The 1939 Amendments remade the 1935 Old Age Insurance
program, which would have provided proportional benefits only for
workers, into Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI), a true social-
insurance program with a weighted benefit formula and spousal and
survivor benefits.58
The common element, from 1935 up to the present, is that benefits are
calculated based on earnings covered by Social Security, while taxes
withheld are an entirely separate system, with no connection to benefits
paid out.59 Critics of Social Security are fond of comparing it to individual
annuities or investment plans, but a more accurate private system
comparison, albeit not precisely similar in all respects, is the employer-
sponsored defined-benefit pension plan, in which benefits are accrued
based on years of employment and financed by employer contributions to a
trust, based on estimates of future financing needs.60 The question that
should be asked is why was payroll-tax financing a feature of the program
system where the old-age benefits are paid directly from the federal Treasury, which is
authorized to collect taxes on wages not exceeding $3,000).
56. See Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-379, § 209, 53 Stat.
1360, 1373-78. The 1939 amendments added two new categories of benefits: dependent's
benefits and survivor's benefits. In addition, the amendments "increased benefit amounts
and accelerated the start of monthly benefit payments." See Soc. Sec. Admin., History: 1939
Amendments, http://www.ssa.gov/history/1939amends.html (last visited April 27, 2010).
57. See CES REPORT, supra note 35, at 43-44 (recommending that contributions be
based upon cumulative earnings to be phased in "1 percent in the first 5 years; 2 percent in
the second 5 years; 3 percent in the third 5 years; 4 percent in the fourth 5 years and 5
percent thereafter").
58. Social Security Act Amendments of 1939 § 201, 53 Stat. at 1362-67.
59. H.R. REP. No. 74-615, pt. 1, at 5-7.
60. For an exhaustive discussion of plan funding methods and elements, see DAN M.
McGILL ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONs 201-333 (7th ed. 1996).
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at all given the partition of benefit accrual from system financing?
After the major revisions of the 1939 Social Security Amendments, the
benefit calculation became more weighted toward low-wage workers, and
survivor benefits were added, making the relationship between
contributions paid in and benefits paid out even more remote and the
system more of a true "social insurance" program.6 1 Nonetheless, it is also
clear from the legislative history that both the Roosevelt Administration
and the Congress at the time viewed contributions by individual workers, as
part of the financing of Social Security, to be an essential element of social
insurance.6 2
Roosevelt's own insistence that workers who would ultimately benefit
from the system should contribute to its costs is well known, as is his view
61. The Director of Old-Age and Survivors Insurance circulated a January 1940
memorandum reflecting the view and purpose of the 1939 amendments. See Memorandum
from John J. Corson, Dir., Bureau of Old-Age and Survivors Ins., to Regional
Representatives and Field Office Personnel, Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (Jan. 10,
1940), http://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/1939no3.html [hereinafter Corson
Memorandum]. This memorandum explained that through a form of social insurance "we
are endeavoring to protect society against the contingency that it will be called upon to
support a large proportion of the people over sixty-five who can no longer support
themselves." Id. The form of social insurance was meant to "replace a part of that wage
income that made for the individual's own security and makes simultaneously for the
protection of society against the neces[sity] of his support." Id.
The revision of the benefit formula reflects the change in the emphasis of the
program. The original provisions offered primarily a plan for systematic savings for
old age. The amendments, on the other hand, are designed to provide a minimum
subsistence income for the retired worker and his dependents or for certain of his
survivors, relating the amount of the benefit to his family responsibilities and, roughly,
to the level of his former earnings as well as to the extent of his participation in the
system. The primary monthly benefit, payable to a qualified worker at 65 or after, is
based on his average monthly wage (as defined subsequently) according to the
following formula: (1) a basic amount of 40 percent of the first $50 of the average
monthly wage, plus 10 percent of the amount by which that average exceeds $50 and
does not exceed $250, and (2) 1 percent of the amount calculated under (1) multiplied
by the number of years in which the worker has received $200 or more in wages from
covered employment. The minimum primary benefit is set at $10.
Lyle L. Schmitter & Betti C. Goldwasser, The Revised Benefit Schedule Under Federal Old-Age
Insurance, Soc. SECURITY BULL., Sept. 1939, at 3, available at
http://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/1939no2.html. "The average-wage formula in the
amendments relates benefits not only to presumptive need, as indicated by the level of
customary earnings, but also to the relative amount of time spent in covered employment."
Id. at 7; see also Social Security Act Amendments of 1939 § 202(a); Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. § 402 (2006) (describing the current benefit formula).
62. An Act to Amend the Social Securiy Act of 1939 and for Other Arposes: Hearing on HR. 6635
Before the S. Comm. on Finance., 76th Cong. 3, 5, 7-8, 16 (1939) (highlighting that contributions
by individual workers were viewed as part of the financing).
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that making direct payments into the system would create an unassailable
"earned right" to retirement income that would not be subject to means
testing.63 The 1935 Committee on Economic Security (CES) Report to the
President echoed this conviction:
Contributory annuities are unquestionably preferable to noncontributory
pensions. They come to the workers as a right, whereas the noncontributory
pensions must be conditioned upon a "means" test. Annuities, moreover,
can be ample for a comfortable existence, bearing some relation to
customary wage standards, while gratuitous pensions can provide only a
decent subsistence. 64
However, by the time the major expansion of Social Security took place
four years later, the link between contributions and benefits was already
being described in more ambiguous terms:
The present old-age insurance system, while maintaining a reasonable
relationship between past earnings and future benefits, provides
proportionately greater protection for the low-wage earner and the short-
time wage earner than for those more favorably situated. In other words, it
recognizes presumptive need as an essential consideration in any socially
adequate old-age insurance system....
But every worker, regardless of his level of earnings or of the length of
time during which he has contributed, will receive more by way of protection
than he could have purchased elsewhere at a cost equal to his own
contributions. In other words, the system recognizes the principle of
63. Senator Moynihan (D-N.Y.) describes President Roosevelt's feelings as follows:
We know one thing in particular: President Roosevelt was absolutely
determined that the payments made into this system would be credited to the
individual who had paid them. Each individual would have an account recording
every nickle [sic] he and his employer put in, and a passbook in the form of a Social
Security card with his or her name on it. In 1941, Luther Gulick, a very distinguished
professor at Columbia University, and one of the founders of the profession of public
administration in our country, was working temporarily in Washington. He went in
to see President Roosevelt, who was not then surrounded by staff.... Professor
Gulick suggested that perhaps the time had come to stop levying payroll taxes
separately from income taxes. Gulick said that it is all really one set of finances.
Should we not just have one rate and collect it at one time? It would be efficient.
Why have two sets of books, two sets of rates of contribution, when one would do?
Gulick went back and wrote a memorandum of the conversation. The President
replied. He said: I guess you are right on the economics, but those taxes were never a
problem of economics. We put those payroll contributions in so as to give the contributors a
legal, moral, and political right to collect their pension and their unemployment benefits with those
taxes in there. No damned politician can ever scrap my Social Security Program. Roosevelt
wanted that money to be identified with the individuals who had contributed it. And
that system worked very well indeed.
101 CONG. REc. 28,086 (1990) (emphasis added).
64. CES REPORT, supra note 35, at 39.
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individual equity, as well as the principle of social adequacy.65
By 1939, it appears the redesigners of the original program viewed
contributions as more of a political mechanism for assuring rights to
adequate benefits in old age rather than as actual payment for a future
retirement annuity or an investment yielding a return in the form of the
retirement benefits. The expansion of the program to meet the needs of
elderly spouses and survivors of covered workers and the acceleration of
payment of benefits to meet more current needs, along with other changes
that expanded the role of Social Security to resemble what it is today,
required a recognition that worker contributions constituted partial, not
complete, financing for the system as a whole, not direct payment for the
benefits they would eventually receive.
In the original estimates for Social Security's financing, even in 1935,
and to a greater extent in the 1939 revamping of the system, worker and
employee contributions via the payroll tax were not seen as the sole, long-
term source of financing. 66 General tax revenues were projected to begin
partially financing benefits at least by the 1960s on the assumption that
contribution rates would not rise above 5%.67 As will be discussed below,
partial nonpayroll-tax financing is completely consistent with the social
65. REPORT OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD, H.R. Doc. No. 76-110, at 5 (1939),
available at http://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/38ssbadvise.html.
66. "There can be no escape from the costs of old age; and since these costs must be
met, an orderly system under which employers, employees, and the Government will all
contribute appears to be the dignified and intelligent solution of the problem." CES
REPORT, supra note 35, at 46. "Since the nation as a whole, independent of the beneficiaries
of the system, will derive a benefit from the old-age security program, it is appropriate that
there be Federal financial participation in the old-age insurance system by means of
revenues derived from sources other than pay-roll taxes." ADVISORY COUNCIL ON Soc.
SEC., FINAL REPORT, S. Doc. No. 76-4, at 6 (1938), available at
http://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/38advise.html. The Social Security Board, while
differing in many respects from the Advisory Council's report, echoed this sentiment:
The Board is of the opinion that it would be sound public policy to pay part of
the eventual cost of the benefits proposed out of taxes other than pay-roll taxes,
preferably taxes such as income and inheritance taxes levied according to ability to
pay.
The portion of the total costs to be met by taxes other than pay-roll taxes should
depend upon the proportion of the general population covered by the insurance
system. The wider the coverage, the more extensive this contribution from other tax
sources might properly be.
REPORT OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD, H.R. Doc. No. 76-110, at 12 (1939), available at
http://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/38ssbadvise.htmL
67. See CES REPORT, supra note 35, at 45 ("Benefit payments will be light in the early
years but will increase steadily until, by 1965, they will exceed the annual receipts. It is at
this stage that the Federal Government would begin to make contributions to the annuity
system . . .. ").
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insurance model and belies any notion that Social Security benefits are tied
in any direct way to their source of financing.68
So what conclusions can be drawn from examination of the fundamental
principles associated with the Social Security contribution and benefit base
that should guide any future changes? First, clearly the level of covered
wages has traditionally been aimed at covering most wages in the national
economy, but the highest wage earners have always had the top part of
their salaries exempted from Social Security taxes and omitted from their
earnings records for benefit computation purposes. It is not clear, however,
that this design feature is necessarily an inviolable basic principle of social
insurance generally or of the U.S. Social Security system in particular.
Second, the causative relationship between contributions and benefits
that so many commentators, as well as members of the public, seem to
perceive as a fundamental principle of Social Security simply does not exist,
at least not in the sense of benefits resulting from or depending on taxes
paid. Benefits are based on earnings recorded in the Social Security
system, not on taxes paid, similar to the way workers covered by an
employer-sponsored defined-benefit pension plan accrue benefits over a
career with that employer.6 9  There has never been any connection
between the amount of FICA taxes paid by a worker and her employers on
her behalf and her ultimate level of benefits. 70
Of course, as a political matter, it may not matter that the tax-benefit
connection does not exist if the public at large believes that it does, but that
is likely a question of ignorance and a generational unfamiliarity with the
principles of accrual of benefits under any kind of defined benefit pension
plan, something with which today's workers have very little experience. 7'
68. See infra text accompanying notes 70-7 1.
69. See 42 U.S.C. § 415 (2006) (describing the computational methods for primary
insurance amounts). I previously described the Social Security system as follows:
Payroll taxes are merely a method of financing the system, not the basis for benefits
earned and paid out. Benefit calculations are made based on earnings recorded in the
Social Security system, which is done as a record-keeping matter through withholding
tax records filed with the Federal Reserve and forwarded to the Social Security
Administration. But benefit calculations do not take into account the amount of taxes
paid, and benefits cannot be reduced in the event of a failure to pay such taxes by the
employer who is responsible for withholding FICA taxes from workers' paychecks.
The system could as easily be financed through income tax revenues, like other
government expenditures, without any impact on the earnings-based benefit
structure.
Patricia E. Dilley, Taking Public Rights Private. The Rhetoric and Reality of Social Security
Privatization, 41 B.C. L. REV. 975, 1000 (2000); see also Deborah A. Geier, Integrating the Tax
Burdens of the Federal Income and Payroll Taxes on Labor Income, 22 VA. TAX REv. 1, 35 (2002).
70. See Dilley, supra note 69, at 1000.
7 1. Professor Stephen F. Befort chronicled this significant shift as follows:
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As a policy question, however, it is time to set aside popular mythology
based on a misunderstanding of the actual fundamental principles of Social
Security financing and benefits, one that clearly distorts both policy analysis
and public understanding of the program.
Finally, the wage-base limit is really a by-product of the original limits on
coverage for benefit purposes and in some ways is a relic of the original
1935 legislation that envisioned Social Security as a type of contributory
annuity to provide for a future limited floor of retirement security.72 That
version of Social Security was replaced, before it ever really took effect, by
the more expansive social insurance model of the 1939 Amendments. 73
Social insurance has a much broader mission-protecting society by caring
for individuals:
Social insurance is one of the ways in which we endeavor to make society
secure.... The basic purpose of all forms of social insurance is to replace a
sufficient part of that wage income when it is lost as a result of any of these
hazards-unemployment, accident, old age, or death of the wage earner-to
insure not only that the individual may look forward to protection, but that
society as well may be protected against the hazards which it faces.74
Clearly, Social Security was explicitly intended, and successfully
functions, as a social stabilizer, protecting society from unrest by giving
Through the 1970s, traditional defined benefit plans predominated. In 1975, for
example, 87% of all workers covered by a pension plan participated in a defined
benefit plan. Since 1980, however, there has been a significant shift toward defined
contribution plans. While the number of employees covered by a defined benefit plan
fell 25% between 1980 and 2000, the number participating in a defined contribution
plan jumped 250%. As of 2005, twice as many American workers were covered by
defined contribution plans as compared to defined benefit plans. Of those with
pension coverage, only 19% of U.S. households are currently covered by a defined
benefit plan, while 58% are covered solely by a defined contribution plan, and 23%
participate in both types of plans.
Stephen F. Befort, The Perfect Storm of Retirement Insecurity Fixing the Three-Legged Stool of Social
Security, Pensions, and Personal Savings, 91 MINN. L. REV. 938, 948 (2007); see also Henry H.
Drummonds, The Aging of the Boomers and the Coming Crisis in America's Changing Retirement and
Elder Care Systems, 11 LEwIs & ClARK L. REv. 267, 281 (2007) ("In summary, the defined
benefit traditional pension system suffers from a marked decline in its coverage of American
workers and a funding crisis in sectors heretofore thought to be its strength.").
72. MULVEY& WHrI4A.N, supra note 41, at 1.
73. See generally Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-379, 53 Stat.
1360.
74. Corson Memorandum, supra note 61. After passage of the 1939 Amendments,
John Corson traveled around the country to explain the new law to employees of the
agency. A Director's Bulletin put Corson's remarks into the written form from which this
quotation is taken. These remarks, I believe, reflect the contemporary and later
understanding of social insurance of most of the original designers of the 1939 bill.
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workers generally the promise of protection against destitution in old age.75
From that perspective, high-wage workers are "purchasing" more with
their Social Security contributions than just their future benefit entitlement,
and the indirect economic benefit of social and economic stability for
society generally, particularly for those most likely to reap the biggest
economic benefit from society and a stable capitalist economy, was an
intentional result.76
No fundamental principle of Social Security is necessarily at stake,
therefore, in consideration of a wide range of proposals to raise, redesign,
eliminate, or add to the base for tax purposes, benefit purposes, or both, or
for adding other sources of financing for Social Security benefits. Even in
1939, the program's designers anticipated that the program's possible
broader financing needs in the future would need to be met either by
continuing increases in the tax base or infusions of general tax revenues.7 7
Any discussion of financing changes that are "true to original principles of
Social Security" clearly should include a broader menu of options than just
increases in the base or rates of the current payroll-tax financing system. It
is particularly appropriate to begin with an examination of the wage-base
limit, as expansion of the base can serve two purposes: increased financial
viability and increased fairness in the eyes of the taxpayers.
75. President Roosevelt made this point explicitly in his statement to Congress even
before the formulation of the Social Security Act:
Among our objectives I place the security of the men, women and children of the
Nation first. This security for the individual and for the family concerns itself
primarily with three factors. People want decent homes to live in; they want to locate
them where they can engage in productive work; and they want some safeguard
against misfortunes which cannot be wholly eliminated in this man-made world of
ours.... The third factor relates to security against the hazards and vicissitudes of
life. Fear and worry based on unknown danger contribute to social unrest and
economic demoralization. If, as our Constitution tells us, our Federal Government
was established among other things, "to promote the general welfare," it is our plain
duty to provide for that security upon which welfare depends.
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Message to Congress Reviewing the Broad Objectives
and Accomplishments of the Administration (June 8, 1934),
http://www.ssa.gov/history/fdrstmts.html#1939b.
76. This result, of course, is quite similar to one premise of progressive income taxation
discussed below: higher income taxpayers benefit more from the institutions and protections
of government and therefore should pay higher taxes. See generally Joseph M. Dodge, Theories
of Tax Justice: Ruminations on the Benefit, Partnership, and Ability-to-Pay Principles, 58 TAX L. REv.
399 (2005).
77. See An Act to Amend the Social Security Act and for Other Purposes: Hearing on H.R. 6635
Before the S. Finance Comm., 76th Cong. 81, 83, 86, 92-93, 101, 250 (1939) (highlighting that
increases in taxes as well as increased contribution rates were considered).
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II. RAISING THE BASE TO TRADITIONAL TARGET LEVEL
The main purpose of the doughnut hole proposal is to increase payroll-
tax contributions to Social Security only from higher wage workers in order
to shore up the long-term financing of the system.78 Setting aside for the
moment the question of whether long-term financing needs to be addressed
at all right now, the first issue should be the appropriate level for the wage
base from a Social Security program perspective. Apart from political
considerations, the base's two separate roles need to be reimagined from
the perspective of the Social Security program's mission itself and not
simply from a tax policy or political salability perspective.
Social Security was designed and has developed over several decades as
a way to deal with certain problems that still exist: insuring working people
and their families against the chance of destitution when they are no longer
able to work (whether because of old age, disability, or death) and, as a
result, promoting social stability throughout the life cycle.79 The central
criterion to be applied to proposed modifications of the base (for benefits,
contributions, or both) is whether the changes improve or detract from the
program's ability to continue to meet that central purpose. This is not to
ignore the impact of the dedicated payroll-tax base as part of the overall
federal tax structure. Nonetheless, the programmatic purposes of the wage
base should be balanced against the overall economic impact of base
increases on Social Security taxpayers and beneficiaries.
One clear rationale for another round of ad hoc contribution and benefit
base increases can be found in a comparison of wages covered by the FICA
wage base at the onset of the program and now. In 1937, the $3,000
contribution and benefit base covered 9 2 % of all wages in the national
economy, but over the next fifty years, as the economy expanded in the
post-World War II period, the percentage of wages covered declined,
78. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
79. Frances Perkins, the "mother of Social Security" and a member of the original
Committee on Economic Security that developed the proposal for the first Social Security
legislation in 1935, described the origins of Social Security in a speech to Social Security
Administration employees on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the program as follows:
We were not yet out of the woods of the Great Depression and, of course, it was the
Great Depression which we must never forget in this country, which was the
proximate cause of this movement which was launched at that time-this movement
to write under the lives of the American people a basis of security which came to them
out of the orderly, substantial, and regular contributions to their future and to the
future hazards.
Frances Perkins, Remarks at the Social Security Twenty-Fifth Anniversary Ceremonies
(Aug. 15, 1960), http://www.ssa.gov/history/25annoasis.html.
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requiring periodic legislation to increase the base.80  At several points
during the history of the program, the disparity between wages actually
covered and the traditional 90 % standard was quite wide-for example, in
1965, only 710% of all wages were covered-and eight ad hoc increases in
the wage base were put in place between 1939 and 1972.81 Indexing the
base to increases in average wages in 1972, combined with the last set of ad
hoc increases that were eventually completed in 1992, was intended to
eliminate the need for ad hoc increases. 82
However, indexing the base to increases in average wages, rather than to
some more comprehensive gauge, such as aggregate U.S. earnings, means
that growing income and earnings inequality allows more compensation at
the top of the earnings scale to escape the base. While the earnings of
about 9 4 % of all U.S. workers are completely covered by the 2010 base of
$106,800, the share of total wages subject to the payroll tax has been
steadily falling-from about 90% in 1982, at the time of the last big Social
Security financing bill, to 85% in 2005-mainly because of the great
disparity between average wage increases and compensation increases for
the highest wage earners. 83 If no additional changes are made to the wage
base, it is projected to cover only 83% of wages by 2014.84 However,
increasing the base to cover 90% of wages in the national economy would
not be a trivial change. For example, in 2005, meeting that goal would
have required a jump from that year's base limit of $90,000 to $150,000.85
Even so, no matter what measure is used, increasing the contribution
and benefit base at least back up to the 9 0 % level seems to be the easiest
case to make from the perspective of fidelity to the basic design and purpose
80. See generally Patricia P. Martin & David A. Weaver, Social Security: A Program and Policy
History, 66 Soc. SECURFTY BULL. 1, 1 (2005), available at
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v66nl/v66nlpl.pdf.
81. See, e.g., MULVEY & WHITMAN, supra note 41, at 4.
82. In 1973, Commissioner of Social Security Robert M. Ball explained that major
social security legislation enacted inJuly 1972 included
[an increase] from $9,000 in 1972 to $10,800 in 1973 and to $12,000 in 1974 the
maximum amount of a worker's annual earnings that may be counted in figuring his
and his family's social security benefits (and on which he pays social security
contributions) and provided in addition for keeping the amount up to date
automatically in the future as average wages rise; and a revised contribution rate
schedule ....
Robert M. Ball, Social Security Amendments of 1972: Summary and lgislative History, Soc.
SECURITY BULL., March 1973, at 3, 3, available at
http://www.ssa.gov/history/1972amend.html.
83. KATHLEEN RoMIG & JANEMARIE MULVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., SOCIAL
SECURFTY: RAISING OR ELIMINATING THE TAXABLE EARNINGS BASE 1 (2009).
84. Id.
85. Id.
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of Social Security, for several reasons. From a simple financing perspective,
it could be argued that coverage of almost all, if not 100% of, wages earned
is one way to insure adequate financing of current benefits without having
to increase the FICA rate to levels that would be extremely burdensome for
lower and middle wage workers. Nonetheless, there is more to the base
than financing concerns, which may make raising it a programmatic
necessity regardless of financing concerns. It makes sense, then, to unpack
the base into contribution purposes and benefit purposes and to examine
the rationales for each type of limit independently.
A. Benefit Base
The traditional goal of including at least 90% of wages for both benefit
and tax purposes satisfies important political and philosophical objectives of
social insurance-if almost all workers and most of their wages are covered,
they have a commitment to the program for themselves as well as for
society in general. However, the importance of universal benefit
coverage-both of workers and of their wages-goes deeper than creation
of stakeholders.
Coverage of most earnings for benefit purposes is the underpinning of
social insurance's role of encouraging social stability-tying together
economic interests of working, middle, and upper economic classes. It is
not surprising that the designers of Social Security thought it important to
cover at least earnings up to the top 10% of wage earners, given the
dramatic downturn of economic fortunes during the Great Depression that
saw those even at or near the top lose assets and the capacity to earn
through no fault of their own.86 Melding the interests of top and bottom
earners served not only as political glue but as a stabilizer of economic
expectations for society generally-wage earners covered by Social Security
might fall down the economic ladder, but in old age they would not need to
appeal for government aid to the poor.87
While some workers manage to earn at or above the base for their entire
careers, many more have earnings histories that fluctuate, sometimes
dramatically, over thirty-five to forty years of work.88 If the benefit base is
86. See generally DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERUCAN PEOPLE IN
DEPRESSION AND WAR, 1929-1945, at 58-59 (1999) (providing examples of the poor
economic climate during the Depression, such as the 26,355 business failures by the end of
1930).
87. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
88. The University of Michigan Retirement Research Center studied this phenomenon
and concluded,
In practice, when we compare the hypothetical profiles with actual earnings, we find
that the scaled profiles do not compare well to actual earnings paths. One reason for
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compressed and fails to capture earnings near the top, benefits could be
dramatically affected for workers who have some good years accompanied
by many average or below average ones. The whole point of providing an
entitlement in the future to benefits based on past earnings is to allow for
the possibility of misfortune along the way to old age, to provide income
assurance in advance and without proof of need at the time benefits are
paid.
Correcting the benefit base to cover at least 90% of wages (not just
workers) is thus completely consistent with fundamental principles of Social
Security and indeed is necessary to fulfill program benefit goals of adequate
benefit replacement and program participation. Raising the base higher
than the traditional 90% coverage standard raises additional questions,
however. One rationale that has always been given for limiting benefit
coverage to earnings up to, but not above, the benefit base is that
replacement of any part of wages above the base is unnecessary in a public-
benefit program.8 9  Given the increasing concentration of wealth and
this divergence is that the assumption of steady work does not track the experience of
actual Health and Retirement Study (HRS) workers. Well over one-third of all men
and women in our sample did not have covered earnings in their 20s, and many
women had zero earning years after that. All the hypothetical profiles are higher and
flatter than the typical HRS workers in our sample. We also find that the Average
Wage Index, intended to reflect a weighted average of actual earnings at any given
time, does not match the average earnings of any given cohort. In addition, the AWl
exceeds average actual earnings during working cohorts' early years, and, using
measures unaffected by high outlier earners, it is still higher than HRS actual cohort
earnings in all years. Further, median HRS actual earnings were more similar to the
low versus the medium scaled profile. Even after restricting the HRS sample to
respondents with substantial work histories, the medium scaled profile is 28% above
HRS actual median earnings, implying a lifetime difference of more than $150,000.
Andrew Au, Olivia S. Mitchell & John W.R. Phillips, Modeling Lifetime Earnings Paths:
Hypothetical Versus Actual Workers 19 (Univ. Mich. Ret. Research Ctr., Working Paper No.
2004-074, 2004), http://www.mrrc.isr.umich.edu/publications/papers/pdf/wp 0 74.pdf. In
addition, the Center for Retirement Research Center at Boston College found,
Few workers have level career earnings, so the traditional approach to policy
simulation represents a serious distortion of actual labor market experience.
Moreover, differences in the pattern of career earnings can produce wide disparities
in pension entitlements, even for workers with the same average earnings, under
individual account and other retirement plans.
Barry Bosworth, Gary Burtless & C. Eugene Steuerle, Lifetime Earnings Patterns, the Distribution
of Future Social Security Benefits. and the Impact of Pension Reform (Ctr. for Ret. Research at Boston
Coll., Working Paper No. 1999-06, 2000), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=252052.
89. See ROMIG & MULVEY, supra note 83, at 1 (explaining that the Social Security
program was originally intended only to "provide a 'core' benefit as a floor of protection
against poverty").
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earnings levels at the top end of American incomes and the growing
inequality of those incomes, it might be appropriate to raise the benefit base
above 9 0 %, but there is no clear line indicating how high is too high.
B. Contribution Base
The programmatic connection between the base and benefits is clear-
the base serves as a limit to the amount of earnings that can be used to
calculate the ultimate benefit entitlement, and the level of the base is
important in capturing a complete picture of a worker's earnings history.
The connection between the base and wages subject to FICA, however, is
less clearly connected to Social Security program goals beyond simply
raising sufficient funds to pay benefits. The wage aspects of the base,
therefore, unlike the benefit aspects, implicate both Social Security
programmatic principles and general tax justice and policy issues.
1. The Contribution Base from a Programmatic Perspective
As described earlier, the original base was set at $250 per month, or
$3,000 per year for benefit-accrual reasons, but it is not clear that the
House drafters of the 1935 Act had anything more in mind than simple
symmetry when they used the same limit for FICA purposes.90 This
symmetry is consistent with the original vision of the program as a
compulsory, federally sponsored annuity program.9 1 This original design
explains the insistence in the original bill on categorizing payments into the
system as "contributions" rather than taxes-employees were described as
making contributions to social insurance, while employers were said to be
paying an "excise tax" on their employees' wages.92
However, while workers clearly felt they were contributing to their own
future retirement through the FICA tax withheld from their wages, it is not
clear that policymakers viewed those withheld amounts as anything other
than taxes, albeit taxes dedicated to the financing of those future benefits.
90. See supra note 43 (describing how the Social Security Administration calculated
benefits in 1935).
91. From the descriptions in the 1935 CES Report and other documents, the original
design resembled an employer-provided pension plan more than social insurance:
Pensions sufficient for a decent subsistence for all of the aged who are dependent
upon the public for support are approved by the overwhelming majority of the people
of this country. In order to reduce the pension costs and also to more adequately
provide for the needs of those not yet old but who will become old in time, we
recommend a contributory annuity system on a compulsory basis, to be conducted by
the Federal Government.
CES REPORT, supra note 35, at 42.
92. Id. at 22.
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The 1938 Advisory Council's report to the President on the upcoming
rewrite of the Social Security Act describes both the employee and
employer shares of FICA as a tax and further recommends requiring
employers to show employees the amount of taxes deducted from their
wages under the old-age insurance system.93 The expansion of Social
Security in the 1939 Amendments into a true, broad-based social insurance
program protecting workers and families from future need in retirement or
because of early death made it harder than ever to view the program as an
individual annuity system. 94  The public entitlement required public
financing, even if most of the needed funds came through the dedicated
payroll tax.
As discussed earlier, it is important for the benefit base to cover at least
9 0%  of earnings in the U.S. economy if the Social Security program is to
meet its goal of paying benefits that provide adequate, but not excessive,
earnings replacement for workers whose earnings may greatly fluctuate
throughout their working lifetime.9 5 The question is whether there is a
93. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON Soc. SEC., FINAL REPORT, H.R. Doc. No. 76-4, at 6-7
(1938), available at http://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/38advise.html.
94. GEOFFREY KOLLMANN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., SOCIAL SEcuRrlY: SUMMARY OF
MAJOR CHANGES IN THE CASH BENEFIT PROGRAM: 1935-1996, at 2 (1996), available at
http://www.ssa.gov/history/pdf/crs9436.pdf.
95. This concern was expressed very early in the switch from cumulative to average
earnings as the basis for calculating the primary insurance amount (PIA):
The Board recommends that benefits be calculated upon the basis of average wages,
rather than, as at present, upon total accumulated wages. This change would make it
possible to increase early benefits and to relate benefits more closely to the previous
normal wage income of the individual. It would also eliminate, as the years go by, the
large bonus which present provisions would afford those who have had only a brief
period of participation prior to the date of retirement. . . .
While the Board believes that benefits should be related to the average wage, it
recognizes that benefits should also be related to the number of years the individual
has been in covered employment and has made contributions. The Board therefore
recommends that an insured individual, upon retirement, receive a basic benefit
related to his average wages; and that, for every year he has earned more than some
small specified amount ofwages in covered employment, his basic monthly benefit be
increased by a specified percentage. Conversely it recommends that for every year a
person does not earn this specified amount of wages, the basic monthly benefit be
reduced by the same percentage.
REPORT OF THE SOCIAL SECuRrrY BOARD, H.R. Doc. No. 76-110, at 6-7 (1939),
http://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/38ssbadvise.html. The latter part of this
recommendation, to increase or reduce benefits based on years of earnings above or below a
set limit, was not included in the final 1939 legislation. However, other aspects of the benefit
formula, such as dropping out the lowest five years of earnings before calculating the
average indexed monthly earnings (AIME), may be said to be addressing some of the same
concerns.
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similar programmatic imperative for setting the wage base at 9 0% or more
of average earnings. The contributory function of the payroll tax is its most
direct connection to Social Security program objectives, as it was
envisioned originally as a way to establish an unbreakable political
entitlement to eventual benefit receipt.96 It is not clear, however, that the
absolute level of contribution is particularly significant in the creation of
that entitlement.
For one thing, as discussed above, there is no-and never has been
any-statutory connection between entitlement to benefit payments and
payroll taxes paid. Benefits are required to be paid to each worker who has
satisfied the basic requirements for coverage-based on earnings reported
or demonstrated to have been earned for the requisite number of
quarters-whether or not her employer actually withheld the proper
amounts or paid over to the Treasury amounts owed.97 Moreover, in a
public program governed by statutes that can be amended at any time by
Congress, the entitlement of any worker to any particular benefit is
theoretically subject to change any time Congress is in session, regardless of
any contributions made over her working lifetime.
In reality, in the entire history of Social Security, no Congress has ever
acted to reduce the current benefits of workers already receiving them, and
only once has Congress reduced a scheduled increase in benefits for
beneficiaries already in pay status: the 1983 Social Security Amendments
delayed the annual cost-of-living increase from June to December on a
permanent basis, beginning with the 1983 Cost-of-Living Adjustments
(COLA).98 This action was only taken during an extreme financial crisis in
which the system's reserves were scheduled to be exhausted in the middle of
1983, making it impossible to pay the full amount of benefits due out of
either current or accumulated payroll taxes, a situation not currently
predicted to occur again until around 2040.99
The same cannot be said for benefits scheduled to be paid but not yet in
payment status. Congress has acted several times to amend the program to
reduce or eliminate benefits promised to future beneficiaries. One major
96. See MULVEY & WHITMAN, supra note 41, at 1.
97. See supra note 23 and accompanying text; see also Social Security Act of 1935, Pub.
L. No. 74-27 1, § 202, 49 Stat. 620, 623; Social Security Amendments of 1939, Pub. L. No.
76-379, § 202(a), 53 Stat. 1360, 1363-67.
98. See Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65.
99. See id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 98-25, pt. 1, at 1-2 (1983), reprinted in 1983
U.S.C.C.A.N. 143, 219-20 (describing the economic situation that made the Amendments
necessary); 129 CONG. REC. 7392-94 (1983), reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 143, 498-99;
2008 BD. OF TRUSTEEs REPORT, supra note 8, at 10 (projecting the years in which Social
Security trust funds will be exhausted).
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example of such a cutback occurred in 1977 when Congress corrected an
error in calculating automatic wage indexing of initial benefits, enacted in
1972, which had been discovered to be increasing initial benefits at roughly
twice the intended rate. 00 The correction was made for beneficiaries first
entitled to benefits on January 1, 1979, and the ensuing furor over the
"notch" between benefits for those becoming entitled in 1978 and earlier
and those becoming entitled in 1979 and later made Congress wary of such
abrupt changes in benefits even for future beneficiaries.o10  The 1983
Amendments included possibly the largest cutback ever enacted in benefits
for future beneficiaries in the form of the "increase in the retirement
age."10 2 This change is still in the process of phasing in over a twenty-year
period (Congress having learned its lesson with the "notch baby" furor), but
when completely in effect, it will raise the age for full benefits from 65 (in
1983) to 67 by 2022-a change that is not really an increase in the
retirement age, but rather is a benefit decrease of up to 3 0 % for those
taking benefits before age 67 in 2022 and later. 03
Critics of Social Security point to these kinds of reductions in future
benefits and the ability of Congress to reduce or eliminate any benefits at
any point as proof that there is no such thing as real entitlement to Social
Security benefits regardless of the contributory FICA structure.10 4 But it is
naive to think any sort of private entitlement or ownership right to future
income, whether in private pension plans or investment accounts designed
to produce old-age income, is any more secure than the Social Security
entitlement. 0 5 Private investment accounts are of course subject to the
vagaries of investment markets, not to mention other sorts of losses both in
value and sometimes in title to which private property is also subjected
(bank failures and eminent domain exercise are two examples). 0 6 As for
100. See Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, § 201, 91 Stat. 1509,
1514; see also Soc. Sec. Admin., History of SSA-Related Legislation,
http://www.ssa.gov/legislation/history/95.htm.
101. For a brief summary of the controversy, see Op-Ed, The Greed of the Notch Babies,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1998, at A22, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/ 1988/01 / 13/opinion/the-greed-of-the-notch-babies.html.
102. See Social Security Act Amendments of 1983, § 201(a), 97 Stat. 107 (amending 42
U.S.C. § 416).
103. Id.
104. For an extended discussion of why the Social Security benefit entitlement is just as
secure, and perhaps more secure, than private entitlement in savings and investments, see
Patricia E. Dilley, The Evolution of Entitlemrient: Retirement Income and the Problem of Integrating
Private Pensions and Social Security, 30 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1063 (1996-1997).
105. For a discussion of the public-private determination of property rights, see Amnon
Lehavi, The Property Puzzle, 96 GEO. LJ. 1987 (2008).
106. For a report on the losses to 401(k) account balances from the last two years of
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employer-sponsored private pensions, over the past fifty years, long after
the economic catastrophe of the Great Depression revealed the weaknesses
of pension funding and despite the funding requirements put in place by
ERISA in 1974 and later, employers have frequently underfunded the
trusts financing those plans and subsequently gone bankrupt, leaving the
plan without sufficient funds to pay benefits.107
market downturns, see, for example, Jack VanDerhei, The Impact of the Recent Financial Crisis
on 401(k) Account Balances, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. ISSUE BRIEF, Feb. 2009, at 1, 10,
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI-IB_2-2009_Crisis-Impct.pdf (charting the time
needed to recover from 401(k) losses based on certain equity and non-equity return
assumptions at figures 6 and 7). The collapse of banks is far from a historic footnote, and
their takeover by the FDIC is now a weekly occurrence. One of the first and most extensive
examples was the collapse of IndyMac Bank in California, which was taken over by the
FDIC on July 11, 2008, and resulted in deposit losses in excess of the $100,000 insured limit
for thousands of depositors. See, e.g., William Heisel, IndMac's Shuffle Ran Over Depositors, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 28, 2009, at Cl (stating that an estimated 10,000 IndyMac depositors lost $270
million in deposits); Damian Paletta, Lingling Wei & Ruth Simon, IndyMac Reopens, Halts
Foreclosures on Its Loans, WALL ST. J., July 15, 2008, at Cl (stating that while the FDIC
normally insures up to $100,000 per depositor, nearly $1 billion of IndyMac's deposits were
uninsured). At this writing, there are large numbers of banks on the brink of similar
collapses, thanks largely to the home-mortgage-loan and ensuing foreclosure debacle of the
last several years. See Damian Paletta & David Enrich, Banks on Sick List Top 400: Industy's
Health Slides as Bad Loans Pile Up; Deposit-Insurance Fund Shrinks, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2009, at
Al (stating that 416 banks were on the FDIC's "problem list"); Press Release, FDIC,
Statement by FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair at the Quarterly Banking Profile Press
Conference (Aug. 27, 2009), http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2009/pr09_qbp.html
(stating that the number of "problem" institutions is at a fifteen-year high).
107. For example, an employer's or plan administrator's failure to fiscally respond to the
fluctuation of interest rates can lead (and has led) to the underfunding and termination of
employer-sponsored pension plans. In particular, when interest rates fall, employers
sponsoring private pension plans assume a lower rate of return on the money invested in the
plan. Consequently, the employer must invest more money into the plan to make up for
lower expected returns. Without doing so, it is unlikely that a plan will meet its prescribed
level of expected future funding. However, many employers have failed to conform their
investments with the potential losses attributable to lowered interest rates, resulting in failing
or underfunded pensions. To protect against the risk of underfunded or failed pension
plans, the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) provides a government-
run insurance scheme-the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC)-which insures
nonforfeitable retirement pension benefits for single-employer, defined pension plans.
Nevertheless, the amount of coverage that PBGC can guarantee is limited under ERISA
§ 4022. The principle limitation involves a cap on the maximum benefits that PBGC will
pay. Under § 4022, benefits payable to a participant under a plan are guaranteed only to
the extent that they do not exceed the statutory maximum. Under the single-employer
program, the limit is adjusted annually based on changes in the Social Security contribution
and benefit base. In addition, PBGC does not guarantee benefit payments that exceed the
amount of a participant's accrued plan benefit payable at normal retirement age. See
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1322 (2006). For an
analysis of the current probability of pension-fund failures from a practitioner's perspective,
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Social Security, on the other hand, is backed by the power to tax as well
as by the political will of American workers and retirees who have insisted,
through the political process, on Congress respecting their basic entitlement
to benefits, even in the face of the dire financial emergency of 1983 and the
strong efforts of the second President Bush in 2005.108 There are also two
additional critical differences between the public and private entitlements.
First, Social Security guarantees a level of income in old age, whereas
private investment assets can guarantee only equity ownership, not actual
income in retirement-it is the value and liquidity of the asset when income
is needed that matters, not the security of one's right to the asset.109
Employer-sponsored defined-benefit plans also guarantee a level of income,
but only if they are adequately funded, which is far from a sure thing. 1o In
any event, defined-benefit pension plans have been slowly dying over the
last thirty years so that few American workers will be able to count on them
in the future." Second, the costs of the public-entitlement promise are
spread across the entire working population and guaranteed to be collected
through the public taxing power, while the private-entitlement promise
depends on the economic solvency and well-being of individual workers, of
their employers, or on the market's valuation of assets at the time of the
see Alex D. Moglia, Underfunded Pension Funds: A Ticking Time Bomb for Companies and Taxpayers,
AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 2009, at 46.
108. In a poll conducted in May 1999 by Princeton Survey Research Associates,
[fifty-eight] percent of Americans favored a system that would include private
accounts. The idea was opposed by 33 percent. But the results were almost precisely
the opposite when the same survey asked workers to choose between a program that
guaranteed a monthly benefit based on lifetime earnings, as under the current system,
and a program that would allow individual investment in the market without a
guarantee. Given that choice, 59 percent favored the guaranteed payment, while 33
percent backed private investment.
Richard W. Stevenson, Bush to Advocate PIivate Accounts in Social Securiy, N.Y. TIMES, May 1,
2000, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/05/01/us/2000-campaign-issues-
bush-advocate-private-accounts-social-security.html?pagewanted=all. An Associated
Press/Ipsos poll on Social Security showed consistent near 60% disapproval of President
Bush's handling of Social Security, and a CNN/Opinion Research Corporation poll showed
that by October 2008, there was over 60% disapproval of private investment of Social
Security taxes. See PollingReport.com, Social Security,
http://www.pollingreport.com/social.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2010).
109. I have discussed this point thoroughly in my previous work. See Dilley, supra note
104; see also Befort, supra note 71, at 963-65.
110. See Befort, supra note 71, at 950-51 (stating that "[a] n increasing number of defined
benefit plan sponsors fail to fulfill their pension promises").
111. For a discussion of the declining importance of defined benefit plans, see JOHN H.
LANGBEIN, SUSAN J. STABILE & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAw 58
(4th ed. 2006).
4 1
ADMINISTRATIVE LA WREVIEw
worker's retirement, none of which are either guaranteed or predictable." 2
Thus, the individual worker's contribution to Social Security, which
most Americans today appear to understand goes to pay for current
benefits rather than being saved for their future retirement, establishes a
politically formidable, if not a legally unchangeable, entitlement to benefits.
The function of the payroll tax in forging a strong connection between
workers and the system is therefore, as Roosevelt predicted, an essential
element of the program." 3 The extent to which the dedicated FICA tax
contribution cements worker support for Social Security is hard to measure,
but most polls of taxpayers over the past several decades have shown that
the best tolerated tax has always been the payroll tax. 1 4 The assumption
may be that workers feel they know what they pay the Social Security the
tax for, unlike the income tax which funds the more amorphous
''government."
However, even if the idea of contributing payments based on wages is a
fundamental element of Social Security, the contribution principle alone
still provides little guidance on the appropriate level of the wage base-
programmatic imperatives essentially grounded in benefit-coverage goals
do not necessarily dictate the flat taxation of exactly 90 % of all wages in the
economy. Instead, an examination of tax justice and tax policy principles
112. Yale economist Robert Shiller continues to be the leading and most correct analyst
of both housing prices and stock market cycles. See, e.g., STANDARD & POOR'S,
S&P/CASE-SHILLER HOME PRICE INDICES 2008, A YEAR IN REVIEW,
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/index/Case-ShillerHousing-Whitepaper.
YearinReview.pdf (offering an analytical description of the housing market recession); see also
Robert Shiller, Online Data, http://www.econ.yale.edu/-shiller/data.htm (last visited Apr.
20, 2010) (describing available data sets on consumer price indices from 1871 to the
present).
113. This is not to say that the payroll tax must be the only source of financing-that
question is outside the scope of this Article, but a future article currently in progress entitled
Dedicated to the Ones We Love will explore the broader question of the payroll tax principle in
general.
114. For instance, when asked about their income taxes in a USA
TODAY/CNN/Gallup poll taken September 10-14, 1999, "68% of respondents said their
income taxes are too high, compared with 29% who said they are about right or too low.
When asked about their Social Security taxes, 43% said they are too high, while 49% said
they are about right or too low." Owen Ullmann, Payroll Tax Relief Isn't High Priority, USA
TODAY, Sept. 24, 1999, http://www.usatoday.com/money/wealth/saving/mswl26.htm.
Similarly, according to the Tax Foundation's 2006 Annual Survey, only 14% of those
surveyed (15% in 2005) found the Social Security payroll tax to be the least fair, while 25%
(26% in 2005) found the federal income tax to be least fair and 31% (30% in 2005) found
the federal estate tax to be least fair. See TAX FOUND., 2006 ANNUAL SURVEY OF U.S.
ATTITUDES ON TAX AND WEALTH (2006),
http://www.taxfoundation.org/files/survey-topline-20060405.pdf (similarly demonstrating
that Americans view federal income taxes as less fair than Social Security taxes).
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may provide some adequate guidelines to help properly assess where to
draw the line between appropriate and excess wage-base levels.
2. Contribution Base from a Tax Perspective
Discussion of Social Security financing has generally been relegated to
the province of economists, who apply almost exclusively efficiency-based
critiques to tax systems and who have mainly analyzed the payroll tax in
the context of its possible wage-depression effects as well as its perceived
inability to assure the long-term financing of Social Security benefits, with a
view to building support for privatizing the system. 115 In contrast, my focus
in this Article is the optimal level for the contribution and benefit base from
the perspective of the Social Security benefit program, as well as from the
perspective of the tax system, leaving the comparatively simple questions
about adequate financing for Social Security until the end. Disregarding
for the moment the question of whether the payroll tax itself is the best
financing option for Social Security at all, we can begin a tax policy analysis
of the FICA wage-base limit by examining a couple of issues that frequently
crop up in economists' discussions of the payroll tax-distributional effects
(i.e., the regressive nature of the tax and the base) and the somewhat
amorphous notion of "tax fairness."
a. Distributional Considerations
The payroll tax is commonly criticized as the most regressive aspect of
the U.S. tax system because it taxes all workers at the same rate-6.2% of
wages for the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI)
program and 1.45% of wages for Health Insurance, the Medicare portion
-regardless of their level of earnings and, for the OASDI portion, only up
to the wage base limit.I"6 This "flat tax" contrasts with the progressive
income tax which taxes higher income taxpayers at a higher rate on their
top marginal income.'17 As a result, while workers making $50,000 per year
115. See Lewis D. Solomon & Geoffrey A. Barrow, Privatization of Social Security: A Iegal
and Policy Analysis, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 9, 13-15 (1995); Martin Feldstein, The Missing
Piece in Policy Analysis: Social Security Reform 24-29 (Nat'1 Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 5413, 1996); see also PETER J. FERRARA, SOCIAL SECURITY: THE INHERENT
CONTRADICTION 311 (1980); Martin Feldstein, Toward a Reform ofSocial Security, 40 PuB. INT.
75 (1975) (serving as one of the earliest salvos); SylvesterJ. Schieber &John B. Shoven, Social
Security Refom: Around the World in 80 Ways, 86 AM. EcON. REv. 373, 376 (1996).
116. See Soc. Sec. Admin., Trust Fund Data, Social Security & Medicare Tax Rates,
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/OACT/ProgData/taxRates.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2010).
117. See I.R.C. § 1 (2006) (detailing the different tax brackets under the progressive
income tax); Rev. Proc. 08-66, 2008-45 I.R.B. 1107 (providing the 2009 cost-of-living
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and $150,000 per year, respectively, will pay the same nominal payroll tax
rate, their income tax rates will vary considerably, with the first worker
paying a top marginal rate of 2 5 % on the last $16,050 of her income, while
the second will pay a top marginal rate of 28% on the last bracket of
income. 18 Under progressive rate theory, the FICA tax result is perverse-
the $50,000 a year worker, with fewer dollars remaining after paying for
necessities than the $150,000 a year worker, ends up paying the same
nominal rate on those excess dollars.1 9
As one would expect, the base and rate intersect to aggressively increase
the regressivity of the tax. Since the rate on wages above the base is zero,
the higher the wages, the lower the effective payroll tax rate on the
taxpayer's entire earnings.120 As a result, for example, someone reporting
$300,000 per year in wages is paying an effective OASDI payroll-tax rate of
just over 2 % on all her wages, while someone earning $106,800 (the base
for 2010) or less, is paying the statutory-and effective-rate of 6 .2 %. This
is clearly no longer a flat tax rate; it is a pyramid, the complete inverse of
the progressive income tax in that the more someone earns, the less payroll
tax he pays.
Of course, earnings above the wage base are not counted for benefit
purposes, so the regressive effect of the base could be rationalized as being
essentially irrelevant from a Social Security perspective. It might be argued
that those wages above the base are outside the closed-contribution and
benefit system, and that including them for purposes of calculating an
effective payroll tax rate distorts the contribution-benefit relationship.
Moreover, because the benefit structure is mildly progressive in that lower
wage workers receive benefits that are higher than a strictly proportional
benefit formula would produce, it can be argued that the progressively
structured benefits are a trade-off for a regressive tax structure.' 2'
adjustments for the progressive tax).
118. Rev. Proc. 08-66, 2008-45 I.R.B. 1110, tbl.3. This rate example, of course, does
not include the effects of the rate differential between ordinary income and capital gains
rates.
119. See, e.g., Jason Bordoff & Jason Furman, Progressive Tax Reform in the Era of
Globalization: Building Consensus for More Broadly Shared Prosperiy, 2 HARv. L. & POL'Y REv. 327,
331-41 (2008); Geier, supra note 10, at 821; Vada W. Lindsey, The Widening Gap Under the
Internal Revenue Code: The Needfor Renewed Progressivity, 5 FLA. TAx REV. 1, 13-14 (2001).
120. See generally Deborah A. Geier, The Payroll Tax Liabilities of Low- and Middle-Income
Taxpayers, 106 TAx NOTES 711 (2005) (discussing the burden of payroll taxes on low-income
taxpayers).
121. See, e.g., Posting of the Economist to Free Exchange,
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2009/04/are-payroll taxes regressive
(Apr. 14, 2009, 18:00 EST) (discussing whether social security taxes are regressive or
progressive); 2009 BD. OF TRusTEEs REPORT, supra note 8; see also Investing in the Private
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One problem with the progressive benefit-regressive contribution trade-
off rationale, however, is that it relies on viewing the payroll tax as not
simply a premium-paying mechanism but as an actual payment for
benefits. The trade-off rationale posits that while low-wage workers pay a
higher percentage of their wages than do workers with wages above the
wage base, they get more for those tax payments in the form of
disproportionately higher benefits. 122 However, as previously discussed, the
amount of payroll taxes paid by or on behalf of any worker has no
connection to the benefits she eventually receives; benefit entitlement is
earned, not purchased with taxes.123 While contributory financing is a
fundamental principle of social insurance in the United States,
contributions to cement basic entitlement to ultimate benefits on the one
hand and payments as a quid pro quo for specific benefits on the other are
not the same thing. If benefits are not functionally related to taxes, then the
progressive benefit structure must be-and is-justified on Social Security
program grounds, while the tax system has to be viewed as a financing
mechanism, one of many possible ones, whose distributional effects should
be critiqued based on consistent tax principles as well as Social Security
program needs.
b. Tax Fairness-Who Benefits? Who Pays?
From a distributional perspective, the FICA wage base would be most
equitable if it covered all wages, resulting in an effective wage tax identical
to the statutory payroll-tax rates. Would this be a fair outcome, though,
from a theoretical tax perspective? Standard theories of tax justice have
seldom been discussed in connection with payroll taxes generally, or the
wage base specifically, except as an example of a somewhat crude version of
the "benefit" theory of tax equity:
The prevailing modem view is that the quasi-exchange version of the benefit
principle should be cabined off to government activities that involve citizen
use of government property, facilities, and services.... Arguably,
government insurance, such as Social Security, Medicare, workers'
compensation, and unemployment compensation, also might be included
within the benefit principle to the extent that beneficiaries are limited to
those who (directly or indirectly) pay appropriate amounts of "premiums"
into the system relative to anticipated benefits. On the other hand, these
Market: Heanng Before the Subcomm. on Social Security of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th
Cong. 95 (1999) (statement ofJohn Mueller, Senior Vice President and Chief Economist,
Lehrman Bell Mueller Cannon, Inc.).
122. See Posting of the Economist to Free Exchange, supra note 121.
123. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(a), 413(a)(2)(A), 414(a) (2006).
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programs are mandatory (and therefore operate to override preferences to
self-insure and avoid risks) and often entail redistribution because of the
premium and/or benefit structure.' 24
This view of Social Security taxes as a direct quid pro quo for Social
Security benefit payments when (and if) they are eventually received by the
individual taxpayer is the basis for much of the modern conservative
"money's worth" critique of Social Security.'25 Raising the wage base to
mitigate the harsh regressive distributional effects of the payroll tax would
only exacerbate the perceived inequity of high-wage workers paying FICA
taxes "in exchange" for future benefits that might be less than the
equivalent amount that investments would have earned for them in the
private markets.' 26
However, there are broader articulations of the benefit theory of
taxation that provide an alternate view of Social Security taxes-a view
that is certainly more consistent with Social Security's founding principles
and provides some support for the current tax and benefit structure. While
the "new benefit theory," as Professor Dodge has labeled it,127 does not
provide specific, measured results in terms of benefits for individual
taxpayers, the lack of a direct quid pro quo may be the whole point, as
others have suggested:
To me, the bottom-line question is: How should the costs of maintaining a regulated
capitalist economy, with its laws of supply and demand that create wealth, be allocated
among the members of the population? In my view, essentially all tax revenue goes
toward paying the costs of maintaining a regulated capitalist economy ....
Therefore, the costs of paying for that system should be allocated across the
population at least in proportion to the money benefits extracted under that
124. Dodge, supra note 76, at 405-06.
125. For a succinct statement of Feldstein's view that Social Security is a bad investment,
see MARTIN FELDSTEIN, CATO LNST., PRIVATIZING SOCIAL SECuRITY: THE $10 TRILLION
OPPORTUNIrY (1997), http://www.cato.org/pubs/ssps/ssp7.html.
126. See generally id. I have previously criticized this "rate of return" argument, which of
course has not stopped anyone from making it. See Dilley, supra note 69.
127. Professor Dodge described the "new benefit theory" as follows:
The new and expanded version of the benefit principle purports to be a norm of tax
fairness that avoids the measurement problem inherent in the quasi-exchange version
of the benefit principle by postulating that the measure of a person's benefit from
government is none other than his or her financial (as opposed to psychic) well-being.
Dodge, supra note 76, at 406 (footnote omitted).
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system. The person earning $500,000 per year is able to do so only because he
or she lives in a regulated capitalist system and can exploit the market to sell
products or services. 128
Professor Geier's version of the benefit theory of taxation echoes the
mission statement, as it were, of Social Security as restructured in the 1939
Amendments, which was, as discussed above, to provide a benefit for
society as a whole, not simply to pay benefits to ensure that individual
workers were spared an indigent old age.129 The case for raising the wage
base to cover some or all of the top 10% of earnings is more persuasive if
those earners are seen as paying their FICA taxes not just for their
individual benefits but also for prevention of the social disintegration that
would very possibly flow from allowing a generation of elderly people to
slide even further into poverty than is already the case.130 The "money's
128. Deborah A. Geier, Incremental Versus Fundamental Tax Reform and the Top One Percent
56 SMU L. REV. 99, 119-20 (2003) (footnotes omitted). Geier points out, in another setting,
that
[four commonly invoked "tax justice" fairness norms are: (1) the equal-sacrifice
principle; (2) the principle that persons should sacrifice to government according to
the benefits received from government; (3) the principle that persons should sacrifice
to government according to their standard of living or well-being (what economists
call 'utility'); and (4) the principle that persons should sacrifice to government
according to their respective abilities to pay (meaning material wealth).
In short, current tax policy "fairness" debates typically involve only arguments
concerning whether the "standard-of-living" norm or the "ability-to-pay" norm is
more persuasive. The "benefit" norm is typically viewed as a relic of a simpler time.
It seems to me that the mere exploitation of our economic system to earn
income (including foreign income, which can be earned only because of the U.S. legal
and economic environment that allows and supports foreign direct and indirect
investment)-whether investment income or active business income-is sufficient
under a reconstituted benefit theory to justify (in general) income taxation.
Deborah A. Geier, Time to Bring Back the 'Benefit'Norm?, 102 TAX NOTES 1155, 1155, 1157
(2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted). The same assessment seems to
me to clearly apply to the Social Security tax as well.
129. See supra Part II.B.
130. According to the standard U.S. poverty level measures, the U.S. elderly as a group
are at about the same level of poverty as the population at large; however, this measure has
been criticized as being out of date, ignoring the much higher costs of medicine and medical
care that the elderly disproportionately face. Recently, New York City Mayor Bloomberg's
staff developed an alternative measure under which about one-third of New York's elderly
would be considered to be living in poverty. See Cara Buckley, Ci Refines Formula to Measure
Povery Rate, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2008, at B2, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/14/nyregion/14poverty.html; see also CARMEN
DENAVAS-WALT, BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR & JESSICA C. SMITH, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED
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worth" argument, from this perspective, becomes largely irrelevant in
determining the appropriate level of Social Security taxes, including the
wage base.
c. Optimal Base Level
What then would be the optimal level for the wage base, given that
neither program principles nor tax policy principles provide any specific
guidance? As long as the contribution and benefit base is unified, clearly
the minimum level should be the traditional 9 0 % of wages in the national
economy. The current indexation mechanism is not effectively maintaining
that level, as pointed out above, because the increasing disparity between
high-income earners and everyone else has increased dramatically over the
last two decades.' 3 '
Raising the contribution and benefit base for both tax and benefit
calculation purposes to $150,000, which in 2006 would have covered 90%
of all earnings, would at that point have eliminated about 40% of the long-
term revenue shortfall for the system.13 2 An ad hoc increase of this nature,
however, would mean an immediate tax increase for what might be called
middle-upper income wage earners and would undoubtedly be wildly
unpopular with that group of likely voters, making any such proposal
difficult to enact in the absence of an immediate financing crisis along the
lines of the 1983 financing situation.133
STATEs: 2008, at 2, 18 (2009), http://www.census.gov/prod/2009pubs/p60-236.pdf (noting
that in 2007 the number of poor elderly would be 13 million higher if social security
payments were excluded from income, more than quadrupling the number of poor elderly,
and that the elderly represent 12.6% of the total U.S. population and 9. 2% of the poor
population).
131. See MULVEY &WHITMAN, supra note 41, at 1.
132. Id. at 13. The authors put forth a few options for raising or eliminating the taxable
earnings base. For example,
[o]ne proposal would slowly raise the taxable wage base for both employers and
employees to cover 9 0% of all earnings and credit these taxes to allow individuals to
receive correspondingly higher benefits. In 2006, it was estimated that a cap of
$171,600 would roughly cover 90% of wages. Under this option, benefits at
retirement for high earners would also rise. These changes would have a net positive
impact on the Social Security Trust Funds.... Raising the wage base to 9 0% would
eliminate 43% of the long-range financial shortfall-extending the Trust Funds'
exhaustion date to 2044. To achieve solvency for the full 75-year projection period
under this option, the total payroll tax rate would have to be raised by an additional
1.09 percentage points (from 12.40% to 13.49%) or other policy changes would have
to be made to cover the shortfall.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
133. Id. For a discussion of the importance of the 1983 Social Security financial crisis to
the enactment of rescue legislation, see ALTMAN, supra note 36.
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One widely circulated proposal for gradually raising the base to the 90%
target level was made by the late Robert Ball, former Commissioner of
Social Security and a widely respected voice in social insurance analysis for
fifty years. 34 The Ball proposal was designed to resolve any long-term
financing shortfalls in Social Security revenues by addressing the wage-
base issue as well as adding additional dedicated financing sources to the
current mix of payroll taxes and income tax revenues from taxation of
Social Security benefits. Ball proposed a 2% per year increase in the base
limit, in addition to already-scheduled automatic-indexing increases over
several years, to eventually reach 90% of covered payroll. 35 This is an
example of one possible way to gradually phase in an increase while
minimizing the immediate effect on workers who now have at least some
wages above the current base limit, a clear political advantage. By itself,
this change would do very little to address any near-term financing
concerns, but the base would eventually be brought up to its traditional
target level with only a very small yearly impact in increased taxes for each
worker.
However, even with such an ad hoc increase, whether all at once or over
a long period of time, the base would still be playing catch-up in the future,
as the current measure for automatic increases in the wage base, which uses
average earnings to develop the index figure, misses wages at the top.136 A
further suggestion, therefore, has been made to change the base for the
index calculation from average wages to aggregate earnings, which would
stabilize the 90% level, preventing further leakage resulting from increasing
earnings disparity.137 Such a technical change in the definition of the wage
base would clearly be a correction within the scope and intent of current
law, although the 90% of aggregate earnings target would have to be
reached by one or more ad hoc increases in the current base before any
new indexing measure would be effective. The effect such a change would
have on Social Security financing would depend on how quickly the new
measure was phased in, but modifying the base calculation to use a more
expansive measure would directly address at least some fairness issues of the
current base by making future automatic increases more likely to capture
wages at the top. Such a change would clearly improve the function of the
contribution and benefit base in capturing most earnings for both benefit
and tax purposes. Still, however, from the perspective of the ordinary
134. See Century Found., Social Security Reform Check List #1: The Robert M. Ball
Plan (1999), http://www.socsec.org/facts/Check_Lists/checklistl.pdf.
135. Id.
136. Soc. Sec. Admin., National Average Wage Index,
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/COLA/AW.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2010).
137. See MULVEY & WHITMAN, supra note 41, at 8.
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taxpayer, any limit on earnings subject to FICA is likely to seem unfair.
III. THROUGH THE DOUGHNUT HOLE?
Since 1935, the concept of the contribution and benefit base has
remained essentially unchanged except for regular increases in amount.
Changing the measure of contribution and benefit base increases from
average to aggregate wages could be viewed as one way to redesign the
base, but it would essentially be a correction in the measure used in the
current indexing system, not a fundamental redesign. The innovative
aspect of the doughnut hole suggestion is that it would actually redesign the
base by leaving the current indexed base as it is and instituting a second-tier
base applicable to workers with yearly earnings at or above $250,000
(presumably indexed), thus creating a gap in which earnings above
$106,800 (the limit for 2010) but below $250,000 would not be subject to
FICA at all. 38
President Obama's economic advisors said during the 2008 campaign
that the $250,000 level for his wage-base proposal is not necessarily set, and
that the increase in the wage base on which FICA taxes are assessed might
or might not be linked to an increase in benefit base on which benefits are
calculated.' 39 Obviously, more net revenue would be raised if the wage
base were raised while the benefit base remained set and increased only as
average wages increase. Even if additional benefits were to be paid as a
result of this redesigned wage base, however, the proposal would resolve a
substantial part of the currently projected long-range deficit for the OASDI
part of Social Security.'40
138. See supra note 9 and accompanying text for discussion of the doughnut proposal.
139. The formula for determining the "contribution and benefit base" is determined
each year by applying a formula set forth in § 430. 42 U.S.C. § 430 (2006). For 2008, the
contribution base was $102,000 with a tax rate of 6. 2%. In 2009, the contribution base was
$106,800. Obama's advisors have also suggested that the tax rate above the doughnut hole
would not be the full FICA rate, but rather a 3-4% tax. See supra notes 8-9 and
accompanying text. This kind of "surtax" model is discussed below.
140. As specialists in this area have discussed,
Raising or eliminating the cap on wages that are subject to taxes could reduce
the long-range deficit in the Social Security Tryst Funds. For example, if the
maximum taxable earnings amount had been raised in 2005 from $90,000 to
$150,000-roughly the level needed to cover 90% of all earnings-it would have
eliminated roughly 40% of the long-range shortfall in Social Security. If all earnings
were subject to the payroll tax, but the base was retained for benefit calculations, the
Social Security Trust Funds would remain solvent for the next 75 years. However,
having different bases for contributions and benefits would weaken the traditional link
between the taxes workers pay into the system and the benefits they receive.
MULVEY & WHITMAN, supra note 41. In effect, a decoupling of the wage base from the
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The key feature of this proposal, the gap in imposition of the payroll tax
for those making over the current base but less than $250,000 per year,
bears a strong resemblance to what is popularly known as the doughnut
hole in the Medicare prescription-drug program, a gap in coverage that
was built into the reimbursement structure in the legislation that created
the program in 2004. The Medicare drug program covers drug expenses
up to $2,810 a year and then does not cover drug expenses above that until
the individual's expenses for the year reach $4,550 (these are the limits for
2010), after which reimbursement begins again. 4 1 While this doughnut
hole, as it came to be known, may be effective in limiting program costs
while still providing additional coverage for those with very high drug
expenses, it has proven to be confusing and worrying for elderly Medicare
beneficiaries. 4 2 A tax doughnut hole is unlikely to create that level of
anxiety, but other problems might make it equally unpalatable.
Clearly the main reason for the proposed Social Security base gap is
political palatability, as it would exempt a large group of upper-middle-
class voters (or at least a large number of people who think of themselves as
middle class) from a tax increase. 143 It is unclear whether there is any real
rationale for the doughnut hole beyond the politics of distributional effect.
But if we take this proposal seriously from a policy perspective, despite its
benefit base was accomplished for the Medicare program in 1993 when the wage base was
eliminated for the Health Insurance (HI) portion of FICA but not for the cash benefit
retirement, survivor, and disability programs. The base elimination in Medicare raised few
programmatic concerns because Medicare benefits are in the form of payment of medical
expenses and are not connected to preentitlement earnings or taxes paid.
141. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003,
Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2006)); see
also CTRS. FOR MEDICAID AND MEDICARE SERVS., CMS LEGISLATIVE SUMMARY:
MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003, PUB.
L. No. 108-173 (2004), http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MMAUpdate/downloads/PL108-
173summary.pdf; David Pratt, The New Medicare Part D Prescription Drug Benefit, 17 ALB. L.
SCI. & TECH. 337 (2007). For long-range estimates of the plan, see 2009 BD. OF TRUSTEES
REPORT, supra note 8. "Under the intermediate assumptions, the annual balance is positive
for eight years (through 2016) and is negative thereafter. This annual deficit rises rapidly,
reaching 2 percent of taxable payroll by 2024, and continues rising generally thereafter, to a
level of 3.87 percent of taxable payroll for 2083." Id.
142. See Posting of Victoria E. Knight to Wall Street Journal Health Blog,
http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2008/ 11 /18 /seniors-still-mystified-by-medicares-doughnut-
hole/tab/article/ (Nov. 18, 2008, 16:39 EST).
143. See, e.g., Posting of David Leonhardt to Economix,
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/21/what-about-the-upper-middle-class (Aug.
21, 2009, 11:55 EST) (discussing views on the effect Obama's Social Security proposal
would have on the upper-middle class); GERALD PRANTE, TAx FOUND., NEW CENSUS DATA
ON INCOME GIVES A WELCOME DOSE OF FACT CHECKING TO "MIDDLE-CLASS" RHETORIC,
Sept. 11, 2007, http://www.taxfoundation.org/files/ffl02.pdf.
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many flaws, perhaps there are elements that could be incorporated into
other possible redesigns for the base that achieve some of the goals of the
doughnut hole without creating the same problems. The common thread
of much of the substantive critique of the proposal, however, is the
transformation it would produce in the character of the payroll-tax system,
making it in many ways, mostly unfortunate, more similar to the income
tax.
Sadly, many commentators criticizing the proposal appear to have little
understanding of Social Security's actual underlying principles. Therefore,
it is necessary on the one hand to analyze and critique the doughnut hole
idea from a genuine Social Security and tax policy perspective, while on the
other to debunk at least some of the commentary that cynically or
mistakenly uses distorted descriptions of Social Security core principles to
score political or ideological points. Much of the rhetoric in this
commentary amounts to thinly disguised attacks on Social Security itself,
taking advantage of the doughnut hole proposal to renew a decades-old
challenge to the concept of social insurance. 144
A. Substantive Critique
The principal purpose of the doughnut hole proposal is to increase
Social Security revenues while making the payroll tax less regressive in
impact, all in a politically palatable manner. As discussed above, raising
the wage base to cover at least 90% of wages in the economy is not only
consistent with program purposes, it is probably a necessity given the great
disparity in wages and income in the American economy that has caused
the wage base to lag behind that target.'45 But the Obama proposal would
import distributional equity into the payroll tax to an unprecedented extent
while still holding harmless a large segment of politically influential wage
earners.146
The underlying problem is, of course, that the payroll tax is essentially a
flat tax imposing a proportional tax burden up to the wage base, with a
regressive effect resulting from the lack of taxes on wages above the base.
144. See infra notes 160-75 and accompanying text.
145. For an analysis of the growing gap in income between rich and poor, see ARLOC
SHERMAN, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, INCOME GAPS HIT RECORD LEVELS IN
2006, NEW DATA SHOw: RICH-POOR GAP TRIPLED BETWEEN 1979 AND 2006 (2009),
http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=2789.
146. See, e.g., Posting of Glenn Kessler to Trail,
http://blog.washingtonpost.com/ 4 4 /2 0 0 8/0 6 /13/obamaclarifiessocial securit.html?hpi
d=topnews (June 13, 2008, 11:14 EST) (noting that Obama asserted that his plan "'can
extend the promise of Social Security without shifting the burden on to seniors' while
leaving 'absolutely no change' in taxes for 97 percent of Americans").
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All other factors being even (same base, same definition of wages, etc.), a
flat-rate payroll tax simply cannot produce a progressive-rate tax result,
even though raising the base would mitigate the regressive effect of the
current tax. The doughnut hole proposal is an attempt to go a step further
by essentially imposing a new tax on earnings above $250,000 with no
additional limit; however, while it would increase the overall progressivity
of the payroll tax, it would also create somewhat perverse effects and
incentives for earnings below $250,000.147
First, the open question of whether the proposal would apply to the base
for benefits as well as for taxes has no good or obvious answer. The overall
issue of splitting the two bases as a general proposition will be discussed
below, but in looking at the question strictly in the context of the doughnut
hole proposal, obvious equity issues would arise if earnings above $250,000
were counted for benefit purposes but those between the current base and
$250,000 were not. For one thing, including those top earnings in the
benefit calculation would fly in the face of one principal rationale for the
limit on the benefit base-that workers at the very top of the earnings scale
should not get additional benefits based on those earnings from a publicly
funded social insurance program. 4 8 That objection might be overcome by
the programmatic purpose discussed earlier, that the wage base should be
as inclusive as possible in order to properly reflect the ups and downs of a
worker's record who might be at the top for a few years and near the
bottom for others.149
However, there is no real answer for the complaints of those with
earnings in the gap about getting less in the way of benefit accrual than
those with much higher earnings. This result, while probably not
increasing significantly the overall replacement rates for the highest earners,
would be difficult to explain and very likely would be perceived as
inequitable by those with earnings in the gap and probably by those with
earnings below the gap as well. The political power of the earnings-based
benefit principle would certainly be diminished by a benefit-accrual
structure that to most people would appear as capricious and unfair as the
current Medicare prescription-drug coverage gap does.1 0
147. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
148. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (noting that the benefits base reflects the
concept of limiting upper-income benefits out of public necessity).
149. It might also be possible to amend the benefit formula, currently a three-bracket
structure, to add a fourth tier to provide 10% or 5% of AIME above a certain level, instead
of the 15% provided currently, so as to minimize the effect of the highest earnings on the
ultimate benefit.
150. See Pear, supra note 29 (describing disdain toward the current Medicare doughnut
hole policy).
413
ADMINMISTRATI VELA WREVIEw
Second, the gap would complicate the payroll tax for both workers and
employers, negating one great advantage of any flat tax-simplicity and
ease of collection. Since the payroll tax is essentially administered and
collected by employers, the employers would bear most of the burden of
determining when workers would hit the first contribution base limit so as
to stop withholding at that point, only to have to begin withholding again
later in the year after the $250,000 floor for the next tier of the base was
reached.15 1 From the employee side, the complication would be more a
matter of understanding and acceptance of a more complex structure that
would be difficult to explain. Again, the example of the Medicare
prescription is instructive-regardless of the desirability of the distributional
consequences of the program's coverage gap, it is very difficult to explain,
let alone justify, to those directly affected.
Granted, the elderly population affected by the drug plan may be less
able to absorb the nuances of the changes in Medicare than workers who
are younger and who have less immediately at stake than eighty-five-year-
old widows terrified of being unable to pay for their medications.
Nonetheless, complexity is one of the most widely perceived negatives of
the income-tax system in contrast to the simplicity and relative ease of the
payroll tax, and the more the latter is modified to look more like the
former, the more resistance to any change in the payroll tax is likely to be
created among taxpayers generally.'52
Third, a gap in the wage base would in all likelihood exacerbate already-
existing perverse incentives to game the payroll-tax system by keeping
compensation out of the payroll-tax box. The current contribution and
benefit base limit for the OASDI portion of FICA generally limits its effects
to employees who have few opportunities to change the way they are
compensated in order to avoid the payroll tax. 153 However, when the wage
151. The task would be made even more difficult by gaming opportunities, which are
discussed below. See infra notes 153-57 and accompanying text.
152. "The complexity of our tax code breeds a perception of unfairness and creates
opportunities for manipulation of the rules to reduce tax. The profound lack of
transparency means that individuals and businesses cannot easily understand their own tax
obligations or be confident that others are paying their fair share." PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY
PANEL ON FED. TAx REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR & PRo-GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO FIX
AMERICA'S TAx SYSTEM 1 (2005),
http://www.taxfoundation.org/UserFiles/Image/Blog/ExecutiveSummary.pdf See
generally Stanley S. Surrey, Complexity and the Internal Revenue Code: The Problem of the Management
of Tax Detail, 34 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 673 (1969) (discussing the structural complexity of
the income-tax collection procedure).
153. Most employees do not control the timing of their wages and are governed by their
employer's decisions on how often to pay them (weekly, bi-weekly, monthly, etc.) for services
performed. In many states, in fact, it is illegal for employers to agree to defer wages or
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base was eliminated for Medicare's hospital-insurance portion of the tax in
1993, highly compensated executives and professionals suddenly faced an
additional 1.45 % tax on all their earnings over the regular base. 54 This
relatively sudden tax increase on upper level wage compensation was likely
a factor encouraging the development of a plethora of deferred
compensation and equity compensation techniques that allow highly paid
employees to defer (and sometimes permanently evade) income and payroll
taxation on substantial portions of their income from work.'55
Even though Congress has acted recently to try to rein in the most
egregious of abusive deferred-compensation techniques,1S6 the ability of
highly paid executives to structure their compensation arrangements seems
not to have been substantially limited.157 These techniques would therefore
be available for evasive possibilities for these taxpayers in the event of any
large increase in the payroll tax. The introduction of a gap in the earnings
to which an additional 6.2% of payroll taxes would apply adds more
wrinkles to the possibilities and also increases the universe of workers with
more incentive to distort the character of their compensation. While
workers making less than $250,000 generally have less control over their
compensation than executives and professionals at higher compensation
levels, compliant employers, anxious to avoid the employer share of the
FICA tax, might well be helpful in keeping compensation characterized as
salaries for any period. See, e.g, Stanton v. Lighthouse Fin. Servs., Inc., 621 F. Supp. 2d 5,
14-16 (D. Mass. 2009) (ruling that an agreement to defer the payment of salary violated the
Massachusetts Weekly Wages Act and was therefore void). Executives signing contracts for
deferral of a portion of future compensation under nonqualified arrangements are not
affected by such statutes. For a discussion of the wage realities for lower paid Americans, see
HEATHER BOUSHEY ET AL., CTR. FOR EcoN. PoLicy & RESEARCH, UNDERSTANDING Low-
WAGE WORK IN THE UNITED STATES (2007),
http://www.inclusionist.org/files/lowwagework.pdf.
154. See MULVEY & WHITMAN, supra note 41, at 2-3 (discussing the outcome of the
Medicare wage-base elimination).
155. The general topic of the ability of highly compensated employees to manipulate the
payroll tax system will be the subject of another article. See Patricia E. Dilley, Are [Payroll]
Taxes Really Just for the Little People (forthcoming).
156. See I.R.C. § 409A (2006) (enacted by the American jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub.
L. No. 108-357, § 885, 118 Stat. 1418, 1634-41 (2004)). But see Michael Doran, Time to Start
Over on Deferred Compensation, 28 VA. TAX REV. 223 (2008) (arguing that § 409A of the
Internal Revenue Code and the ensuing regulations implementing it did little to restrain
game playing with executive compensation arrangements).
157. See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity
Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2008) (analyzing private equity funds employing the partnership
form to provide a profit interest to manager partners, thereby transforming services income
into investment income taxed at the capital gains rate, currently 15%, as opposed to
ordinary income, which is taxed at a top rate of 35%).
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wages under the $250,000 limit. This kind of gaming strategy is more akin
to the kind of manipulations that have long plagued the income tax and
might cost the Social Security system much of the limited acceptance the
payroll tax has enjoyed over the years.
In sum, the doughnut hole proposal might achieve marginally better
distributional results in tax burdens than the current FICA wage base does,
but at the high cost of importing to the Social Security tax system some of
the most unpopular characteristics of the income tax-seeming
capriciousness, unreasonable complexity, and increased incentives to distort
economic realities in order to avoid a tax liability.158 The only real
advantage of the gap from a tax fairness perspective is that only taxpayers
at the highest income levels would have increased tax liability, so that those
taxpayers would finally be bearing what many workers who never have
earnings in excess of the wage base would consider a more equitable tax
burden.
Indeed, much of the criticism of the proposal simply points out (with
considerable horror, it must be said) the new, higher marginal tax rates to
which the highest earning taxpayers would be subjected once FICA applies
to wages above $250,000.159 But those increased rates would be the
product of almost any proposal to increase revenues for Social Security,
with or without the doughnut hole. The question is whether the increase in
what many would consider "tax fairness" is worth the considerable
negatives that accompany the gap, and whether it might not be worth
taking the political heat and simply raising the wage base without a gap.
B. The Illusory Critiques
Clearly the doughnut hole proposal has a number of serious problems
when examined from a Social Security program as well as a tax equity and
administration perspective. However, the proposal has also been attacked
158. Some of the unpleasant characteristics of the income-tax system have been
described as follows:
Substantively, the income tax is a mess. Taxpayers at every income level confront
extraordinary complexity. ... Many feel like "chumps" if they pay the taxes they
legally owe. Young people, especially, admit that they feel no compunction about
filling out their tax forms dishonestly. And the Internet has facilitated growth of the
"tax deniers" movement-people who spread their rejection of the legitimacy of any
income tax requirements, including the requirement for employers to withhold taxes
on their employees' wages.
Michael J. Graetz, Taxes that Work- A Simple American Plan, 58 FLA. L. REV. 1043, 1045-46
(2006).
159. See, e.g., Andrew G. Biggs, Barack Obama's Social Security Donut Hole, AELorg, March
2008, at 1, http://www.aei.org/issue/27704.
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by a number of commentators claiming to base their opposition to the
proposal on its betrayal of what they portray as fundamental principles of
the Social Security system. On closer examination, though, many of the
most ferocious critiques are grounded in a complete misunderstanding or
misrepresentation of basic principles of Social Security. The end result,
whether intentional or accidental, is the promotion of notions not only
antithetical to a real understanding of Social Security, but also designed to
paint a false picture about the program's financial future and the
relationship between benefits and financing alternatives.
For example, one commentator, in discussing the President's wage-base
proposal, has said that the link between the benefit base and contribution
base means Social Security was modeled on a "Contributory Model,"
under which "you pay in part of your paycheck until you've paid enough to
'cover' your benefits, then (if you keep earning) you don't have to
contribute any more."160 It is unclear what this commentator had in mind,
but this description bears little resemblance to either the original Social
Security plan of 1935 or the revamped version of social insurance enacted
in the Social Security Amendments of 1939 or, indeed, even to any private
pension model in existence either in the 1930s or later.161 Some employer-
sponsored defined-benefit pension plans can be described as "contributory"
in that they allow or require employees as well as employers to make
contributions. 162 However, such plans were highly unlikely to have served
as a model for planners in the 1930s as they were quite rare until after the
enactment of Social Security, and even under such plans (they are still to be
found in state and local government plans), the employee's contribution
does not limit the amount of benefits paid.163
160. Posting of Mickey Kaus to Slate, http://www.slate.com/id/2193674/#bigdonut
(June 17, 2008, 12:47 EST).
161. See supra notes 38-45 (discussing the original Social Security Act of 1935 and the
Amendments of 1939).
162. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND
BACKGROUND RELATING TO EMPLOYER-SPONSORED DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLANS
AND THE PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORP. ("PBCG") 13 (Comm. Print 2005), available at
http://www.house.gov/jct/x-3-05.pdf (discussing the present rules regarding qualified
retirement plans).
163. Three-quarters of the pension plans established between 1874 and 1929 were
wholly employer financed. The other quarter of plans either required employee
contributions or, less commonly, allowed voluntary employee contributions to supplement
employer-provided sums. The reverberating economic effects of the Great Depression of
the 1930s, coupled with the United States government's creation of Social Security, led
employers to begin largely trending toward implementation of contributory pension plans in
place of defined benefit plans. See Patrick W. Seburn, Evolution of Employer-Provided Defined
Benefit Plans, MONTHLY LAB. REv., Dec. 1991, at 16, 19, available at
http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/1991/12/art3full.pdf. It is not really clear what Kaus
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A persistent element of many of these critical assessments is the charge
that a gap in the base would fundamentally change Social Security or
somehow be in complete contradiction to basic principles of the program.
"Social Security is structured so that the more you pay in, the more you get
back. That's what supposedly makes it a compact among the generations
and not a welfare program. Actually, what it does is make it an inefficient,
disguised welfare program."1 64 In his comment, Ramesh Ponnuru seems to
be assuming that the gap proposal would apply to the wage base alone,
which is probably reasonable given the difficulties discussed earlier with
omitting a large range of earnings records from benefit calculations.
Nonetheless, that feature is not yet actually a part of the proposal according
to Obama's advisors.165
Ponnuru also completely misstates and oversimplifies the structure of
Social Security benefit accrual, which is, as described earlier, based on
earnings, not on taxes paid, and of the Social Security benefit structure,
which provides redistributive benefits based on the weighted-benefit
formula but not paid based on proof of need, which is the essence of
welfare.166 The critique itself, however, reveals the commentator's essential
hostility to the notion of redistribution, something that is hardly a direct
product of the gap but is rather essential to the mission of social insurance.
Another commentator, Nicholas Kaster, echoes the same theme:
Moreover, under current rules, Social Security caps both benefits and
earnings. Thus, unless Obama also favors paying more Social Security
benefits to the wealthier earners---highly unlikely-then his plan undermines
Social Security's historic role as a basic social safety net rather than a
program that redistributes income. This realization has triggered criticism
even from Democrats, including Henry Aaron of the liberal Brookings
Institution and former Rep. Charles Stenholm of Texas. When you say
you're going to begin means-testing the program," Stenholm noted, "you
begin to convert Social Security from an insurance program to a welfare
means by "contributory" pension plan-he might well be thinking of a defined contribution
plan along the likes of a § 401(k) plan, which did not exist until the late 1970s, making it
unlikely as a model for Social Security. See Posting of Mickey Kaus, supra note 160.
164. Posting of Ramesh Ponnuru to National Review Online,
http://corner.nationalreview.com/post/?q=ZjYxMTIwZTIxMTBkYTlhNzhjZDFjNjgwM
WNiZWEzZDc= (June 13, 2008, 17:17 EST).
165. See Furman & Goolsbee, supra note 8; Obama Remarks, supra note 8; Rhee, supra
note 8.
166. See 42 U.S.C. § 415 (2006) (requiring that an individual's basic Social Security
benefit be calculated based on percentages of the individual's average indexed monthly
earnings). For a discussion of the nature of welfare, see FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A.
CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE (1971).
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program."' 67
Kaster is of course mistaken about Social Security's historic role-Social
Security has always functioned as the baseline of income support in old age,
part of the "safety net," but it has done so by redistributing income,
through the progressive-benefit formula, with benefits financed by all
workers regardless of their chances of ultimately collecting benefits, in a
manner similar to private-insurance risk sharing.'18
It is hard to imagine, moreover, how a public program could function as
a safety net without some degree of redistribution. As discussed earlier, the
decision to pay higher than strictly proportional benefits to the lowest
earners was made right from the start of Social Security and is certainly not
a product of President Obama's proposal.169 It is true that means testing
Social Security benefits would fundamentally change the program's
character, but that is not what the wage-base-gap proposal would do.170 It
is a substantial and unsupported leap from a proposal to tax higher wage
workers, with or without allowing them to accrue additional benefits on
their highest wages, to "means testing," which requires actual "testing" of
"means," i.e., proof of inadequate income and assets, and demonstration of
current need.171 The core principle of social insurance is the right to a
stream of income in old age or disability based on presumed rather than
demonstrated need, providing future security while avoiding disincentives
to accumulate and save income and resources. 7 2 This is the diametric
167. Posting of Nicholas J. Kaster to American Thinker Blog,
http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2 00 8 /06/obamasiatest.proposal-to-incr.html
(June 19, 2008, 11:01 EST).
168. Private insurance program distribution methods have been described as follows:
The characteristic of risk distribution sets insurance contracts apart from other kinds
of contracts. It can be said, then, that a contract of insurance is an agreement in
which one party (the insurer), in exchange for a consideration provided by the other
party (the insured), assumes the other party's risk and distributes it across a group of
similarly situated persons, each of whose risk has been assumed in a similar
transaction.
ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAw 14
(4th ed. 2007) (emphasis removed).
169. See supra notes 36-76 and accompanying text (exploring the origins of Social
Security as a redistributive system).
170. See Posting of Nicholas J. Kaster, supra note 167 (arguing that "unless Obama also
favors paying more Social Security benefits to the wealthier earner .. . his plan undermines
Social Security's historic role as a basic social safety net").
171. See generally PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 166 (discussing the welfare program
dynamic).
172.
Although the definition of social insurance can vary considerably in its particulars, it
basic features are: the insurance principle under which a group of persons are
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opposite of the welfare-program dynamic, the essence of which is to support
those who are in current (and in the U.S. program design, dire) need.7 3
The common characteristic of these critiques of the gap proposal is their
mischaracterization of Social Security's basic principles, a distortion that
mainly seems to stem from an underlying opposition to income
redistribution, which is an actual basic principle of social insurance but not
something peculiarly characteristic of the gap proposal itself. The notion
that redistribution from higher wage workers to lower wage workers would
somehow abrogate the "compact between generations" or taint the
earnings-based foundation of the benefit structure ignores the fact that
redistribution from higher income to lower income is at the heart of not just
Social Security, but public financing of government functions generally.174
These kinds of criticisms of the doughnut hole proposal should therefore
be seen less as actual critiques of the gap and more as rhetorical tactics
aimed at contributing to an overall misapprehension of Social Security-
part of the continuing conservative resistance to Social Security's
redistributive income security, a campaign that has persisted through the
entire seventy-five-year history of the program. 175 This strategy essentially
'insured' in some way against a defined risk, and a social element which usually
means that the program is shaped in part by broader social objectives, rather than
being shaped solely by the self-interest of the individual participants.
Soc. Sec. Admin., Historical Background and Development of Social Security,
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/history/briefhistory3.html (last visited May 13, 2010)
(discussing the general principles of social insurance).
173. See generally PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 166.
174. See supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text (discussing Social Security as a
function of redistribution within the larger ambit of the social safety net).
175. Conservative Senator Barry Goldwater published Conscience of a Conservative, a work
criticizing both Democrats and Republicans in 1960; Nancy J. Altman describes his
argument as maintaining that
Social Security and welfare should be provided by the private sector or, if government
involvement was absolutely necessary, by state and local governments, but under no
circumstances by the federal government. Rather, Social Security and programs like
it inevitably, according to Goldwater, lead to "unlimited political and economic
power ... as absolute ... as any oriental despot." The recipient of these programs,
according to Goldwater, is transformed by them "into a dependent animal creature."
ALTMAN, supra note 36, at 199. Republican President Ronald Reagan proposed a Social
Security reform package that included a recommendation to reduce early retirement
benefits among other cuts:
The Reagan proposal would have reduced the benefits for people who retired early
more than the actuarial reduction warranted. Specifically, the law provides that
people who retire at age 62 receive the actuarially equivalent 80 percent of the
monthly amount received by people who retire at age 65. The administration
proposed to reduce the percentage to 55 percent of the age 65 benefit.
Id. at 231. Ultimately, President Reagan dropped the most controversial aspects of his plan
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creates a "straw man" Social Security, one based on individual equity and
return on tax payments that ignores the reality of the actual program of
redistributive social insurance. This falsely reconfigured "Social Security"
is then used to oppose suggested changes that might actually be consistent
with the principles and purposes of the real Social Security program,
ultimately driving the debate into a discussion of false choices about the
program's financial future and benefit structure.
C. Other Options Within the Current Base Paradigm
The doughnut hole proposal is not the only option for revamping the
current wage-base limit with a view to increasing future program revenues.
There are a variety of possible redesigns, which include eliminating the
limit altogether, restructuring the base into a series of progressive brackets,
and expanding the definition of wages to include items such as certain types
of deferred compensation when earned rather than when received and
compensation for services currently characterized as return on equity. A
brief survey of other options for using the base to raise additional revenue
gives an indication of why it is critical at this point to rethink the distinction
between earning benefits and paying for them.
1. Eliminating the Limit on the Contribution and Benefit Base
The rationale for limiting the base at any particular point below 100% of
earnings and wages is somewhat fuzzy and may well be more easily
defended for benefits than for taxes. Rather than raising or redesigning the
base, eliminating it altogether might resolve several issues at once,
especially in spreading the impact of the FICA tax more equitably across
income lines and in raising considerable revenue that would go a long way
toward resolving the possible future financing difficulties of Social
Security. 7 6 Of course, additional questions would be raised from the
absence of a limit specific to FICA, particularly in connection with the
additional benefits that would accrue to very highly paid workers. The
but formed the bipartisan National Commission on Social Security Reform to make
recommendations regarding the Social Security System. Id. at 234, 237. The
recommendations of the Commission are reflected in the Social Security Amendments of
1983. Id. at 253. The next attack on Social Security came from Republican President
George W. Bush, who established a presidential commission to study Social Security and
stipulated "that the commission's recommendations 'must include individually controlled
voluntary personal accounts."' Id. at 265. President Bush continued his campaign to
privatize social security throughout his two terms. Id. at 272.
176. See MULVEY & WHITMAN, supra note 41, at 17-18 (examining the potential impact
of eliminating the wage base).
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fundamental question, however, is whether the limited wage base is really
an essential element of either the Social Security benefit or tax structure.
The benefit base serves as a limit on yearly benefit accruals under Social
Security, a somewhat different approach from the benefit-accrual systems
permitted for use in private defined-benefit pension systems. In private
defined-benefit systems, benefits accrue over the working career, usually
ratably for each year of service, and the final benefit is usually based on the
average of several of the highest years of wages under the plan-highest five
or highest three, for example-multiplied by a percentage formula and the
numbers of years of service under the plan.177 There is no real counterpart
to the Social Security benefit-base limit in private plans, whose benefits to
highly paid participants are now limited primarily by the tax
nondiscrimination rules which require (theoretically, if not always in
practice) roughly comparable benefits to be paid to highly compensated
and non-highly-compensated employees. 7 8
The primary difference between benefit accrual under private systems
and under Social Security is that the distributional goals of private plans are
generally the mirror opposite of the public social insurance program.
Private plans generally strive to place as much of the total benefits as
possible into the hands of the most highly paid participants, and inclusion
of the highest levels of compensation in benefit calculations helps to serve
that end.179  The Social Security benefit structure, in contrast, has a
function peculiar to an earnings-based social insurance system in that it is
designed to provide proportionally higher benefits, as a percentage of
lifetime earnings, to lower earners.180 The benefit formula determines the
level of income replacement for beneficiaries with earnings records at all
levels, but the base limit implicitly sets the target for the highest income
level we are willing to insure with public funds, since earnings above the
base are excluded from the earnings record to which the benefit formula is
applied.
The issue of limiting the public subsidy for high-income beneficiaries is
important, particularly since one of the only areas of publicly perceived
unfairness in the Social Security benefit structure itself is the receipt of
177. See generally McGILL ET AL., supra note 60.
17 8. Id.
179. Id.; see also Michael J. Graetz, The Troubled Marriage of Retirement Securiy and Tax
Policies, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 851, 876 (1987) ("The revenue loss attributable to private
pensions has been estimated to benefit high-income workers disproportionately, and the
distribution of benefits from private pension plans is skewed in the same direction.").
180. The decreasing percentage applied to increasing levels of wages in the benefit
formula produces this result. See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 402 (2006) (stating the
current benefit formula).
[62:2422
2010] THE SOCIAL SECURITY Co.NRIBuTIONAND BENEFIT BASE LIMIT
benefits by people who apparently do not need them.181 Yet there is no
persuasive programmatic reason (as opposed to political) why the benefit
formula could not achieve most of the benefit-limitation goals without any
limit on earnings recorded for benefit accrual. As a mechanical question, it
would be quite feasible to amend the benefit formula to reduce the benefit
accrual on those wages by adding gradually smaller brackets for higher
levels-for example, adding decreasing accrual rates on top of the current
top 15% rate, to be applied to wages above the current base at brackets
designed to produce minimal increments in ultimate benefit amounts. If
the objection to inclusion of all earnings in the base is the prospect of
excessive publicly funded benefits, a revised benefit formula could insure
diminishing replacement rates for wages at the top level and minimize the
resulting increase in benefits.
Moreover, there is a reasonable argument for including even earnings at
very high levels over a worker's thirty-five or forty-year working career. As
discussed earlier, few workers consistently earn at an extremely high level
throughout their careers, and it could be argued that the ultimate benefit
amount for an earner with a volatile earnings record would more fairly
reflect her lifetime average record if the years with very high earnings were
included in benefit calculations.'82  Nonetheless, the question remains
whether allowing the benefit structure to reflect lifetime earnings for all
workers, regardless of earnings levels, is consistent with the targeted
earnings-replacement rates on which the benefit structure is based and with
the principles of social insurance. As discussed above, the limit on the
amount of wages subject to FICA taxes was essentially a by-product of the
program designers" determination to cover industrial employees for benefit
purposes and has been maintained largely as a matter of symmetry with the
181. See, e.g., Posting of Casey B. Mulligan to Economix,
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/02/24/are-we-overpaying-grandpa/ (Feb. 24,
2010, 6:00 EST). For a response to this suggestion, see Posting of Dean Baker to Beat the
Press, http://www.prospect.org/csnc/blogs/beat-the-press archive?month=02&year=
2010&base-name=the-government-pays-more-money (Feb 25, 2010; 05:10 EST) ("Of
course, it would be foolish to compare the money that rich investment bankers get in interest
payments on money they have lent to the government with the pure transfer payments that
the government makes to ensure that poor children have a decent chance in life. But, it is
also foolish to compare the retirement benefits that seniors have largely paid for during their
working life, through Social Security and Medicare taxes, with the pure transfer payments
that the government makes to ensure that poor children have a decent chance in life."). For
a discussion of what means testing of benefits might mean for the program, see AMER.
ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, MEANS TESTING FOR SOCIAL SECURITY (2004),
http://www.actuary.org/pdf/socialsecurity/means-0 104.pdf.
182. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (noting that earnings often fluctuate over
the course of a worker's career).
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benefit base.18 3 From a programmatic perspective, then, there appears to
be no real reason to exclude any wages from the wage base if all earnings
are included (at least to some extent) in the benefit base. From a tax
perspective, elimination of the base would essentially result in an increase of
the top marginal tax rates on wage income alone, which would exacerbate
an already-existing issue-the problem of top levels of compensation
escaping FICA taxes altogether.
Wages would appear to be a less malleable base for taxation than
income-they are recorded and reported by a third party, the employer,
and for the most part the amount and timing of an employee's wages are
not under the recipient's control. But highly compensated workers whose
wages now largely escape the OASDI portion of FICA because they are
above the wage base are far more likely to control the form and conditions
of their compensation than the vast majority of salaried or hourly workers.
Highly paid executives are better able to recharacterize compensation as
non-wage income or to delay receipt in order to manipulate the timing and
amount of tax liability.184 As discussed earlier, these mechanisms became
more popular and important to highly compensated executives when the
limit on the base for purposes of the Medicare hospital-insurance portion
(1.45%) of the FICA tax was eliminated in 1993.185 Any attempt to impose
an additional 6.2% OASDI tax on top of earnings will inevitably encourage
even more strategies to avoid compensation in the form of wages. In the
absence of measures to capture compensation in disguise, eliminating the
limit on the wage base for tax purposes may result in far less revenue than
might be anticipated.
2. Making the Base Progressive
Simply raising or eliminating the current base limit is not the only option
for making the base more fair and effective in financing and calculating
benefits. So long as most wages of most workers are included in the main
contribution and benefit base, a tiered approach for wages above the
currently applicable base might be explored. This would be similar to the
doughnut hole proposal in some ways, except that instead of a gap where
no tax is imposed followed by full taxation above the gap, intermediate base
levels and taxes could be added to the current base. For example, half the
183. See generally supra notes 41-42.
184. See supra notes 153-58 and accompanying text (discussing the ability of higher paid
persons to engage in gaming of the Social Security benefit system).
185. See MULVEY & WHTTtAN, supra note 41, at 8 (noting the elimination of the
Medicare wage base and discussing potential effects of elimination of the Social Security
wage base in comparison).
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current tax rate could apply to wages between the current base and
$250,000, and then a quarter to 3 0 % of the rate to wages above that, with
proportionately smaller benefit accruals at each level.186 There are many
possible variations on the theme of a progressive wage base, but the
essential goal is a compromise, allowing the benefit-accrual system to
partially reflect earnings above the current base level while imposing the
wage tax on all earned income.
Such a tiered system would clearly be the inverse of a progressive rate
structure, and would import some of the complexity of the tiered income-
tax design into the payroll tax. On the other hand, it would reduce some of
the incentives for gamesmanship at the top wage levels because the tax rate
would be less than the full 6.2%, which would provide some benefit accrual
even at the very top of the earnings scale. Most importantly, perhaps, such
a base structure would restore some fairness to the payroll tax in the mind
of most taxpayers by imposing at least some FICA tax on all wages. It is
unclear, however, that the complexity resulting from mirroring the
progressivity of the income tax (limited as it is) in the payroll-tax base is
worth the effort, particularly when there is a more direct, simpler, and
ultimately more flexible way to accomplish the same goal. That solution,
however, requires some fundamental rethinking of the basis of entitlement
to Social Security benefits.
IV. RETHINKING THE BASE LIMIT PREMISE
While the doughnut hole proposal may lack credibility and substance as
a serious policy proposal at this point, even suggesting such a change opens
the debate about FICA taxes to a new level of questions about what other
design changes might be considered that would improve the future finances
of Social Security while also promoting its programmatic goals. What is
necessary is a simple but fundamental shift in thinking, albeit one grounded
in the program's original and enduring premise that work itself creates the
right to security and that could lead to more creative approaches to future
financing shortfalls in Social Security, based on decoupling the base for
earning benefits from the base for payroll taxes. Such an approach would
make it easier to consider alternative revenue options, to add to the current
186. This tiered approach is similar to legislation introduced in the 109th Congress by
Representative Wexler. His bill, H.R. 2472, would impose an additional Social Security
contribution of 3% of wages above the current wage base on workers and employers. In his
bill, however, earnings above the base would not be included in the benefit computation
base. See Social Security Forever Act of 2005, HR. 2472, 109th Cong. (2005), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 109 congbills&docid
=f:h2472ih.txt.pdf.
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nonpayroll-tax sources of financing Social Security, that would achieve
greater parity in tax burdens and additional revenue (if and when that is
necessary) without violating any real basic principles of social insurance.
This refraining is essentially focused on the legal basis of entitlement
under Social Security: both Medicare and Social Security cash benefits are
earned through working, not through paying payroll taxes, and benefits are
financed through many sources, not just payroll taxes.187 Payroll taxes
finance not the individual benefits of the taxpayer but the overall Social
Security system and the furtherance of its goals, ultimately social stability
and individual financial security.188 The failure to recognize and structure
public policy around the distinction between taxes paid and benefits earned
has made the payroll tax into a straightjacket on analysis and development
of financing options. Once the distinction is recognized, however,
reimagining the contribution and benefit base (and in particular the limit)
becomes a real possibility and more than an academic exercise.
The traditional defined-benefit pension model, particularly the concepts
of benefit accrual combined with program-funding requirements, provides
an analogy that may make this distinction easier to recognize. Employer-
sponsored pension plans base the ultimate benefit of participants in the plan
on, in part, a method of accruing benefits over the participant's years of
service with the employer, similar to the years of earnings credits tracked by
the Social Security Administration for each worker covered by the
program.18 9 Financing of private pension benefits, on the other hand, is a
completely separate issue, with funding requirements based on funding
needs for whatever benefits have been promised under the terms of the
plan.190 While there are many dissimilarities between Social Security and
employer-provided pensions, in this respect the comparison is an apt one-
workers earn their private pension benefits, and plan sponsors, normally
employers, fund the trust that eventually pays those benefits. In the same
way, it is work that creates the entitlement to Social Security benefits, and
those benefits are funded by the "plan sponsor," the taxpayers themselves,
with the federal government as the manager of the plan and its trust.
If we separate the tax function of the base from the benefit-accrual
function, immediately the policy options for increasing revenues to the
Social Security system are freed from the inherent regressivity and possible
employment impact of payroll-tax increases. The possibilities for additional
187. See supra notes 121-30 and accompanying text (discussing the erroneous notion of
Social Security as a system that returns benefits based on the amount of tax contributed).
188. Id.
189. See supra note 177 and accompanying text (explaining how benefits accrue during
an employee's working career).
190. See id. (discussing financing of private pension benefits).
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financing range from a dedicated income surtax on taxpayers with more
than $250,000 in earned income in a year, which would mimic the Obama
payroll-tax proposal, to simply supplementing payroll-tax revenues with
general tax revenues in any year in which the trust fund reserves are
inadequate to fully fund benefit payments. Even the President's doughnut
hole proposal might be more feasible if it produced additional revenues
from the highest wage workers with no additional benefit entitlement,
although all the aforementioned problems with tax avoidance would still be
a formidable obstacle.
If additional revenues are the only goal, it might be more consistent with
Social Security principles to simply impose a surtax on income-not
wages-above a certain adjusted gross income level, whether $250,000 or
$200,000, and earmark the results for financing Social Security. This
approach would have many signal advantages-the tax rate and affected
income level could be adjusted simply based on financing needs rather than
on juggling issues of benefit accrual and wage definitions. A surtax could
also be readily justified based on the last two decades of changes in the
nature of compensation from wages to other types of compensation which
escape the wage base, as well as the skewing of the American income
structure to an imbalanced share of national income and wealth at the
top.'9 ' Such a tax could also be said to make up for the dramatic loss of
employer-provided pensions over the last twenty years at the expense of
working people's retirement security while the highest corporate earners
steered a higher and higher proportion of company earnings into their own
compensation packages. 192
The major objection to these approaches would of course be that it is
somehow a breach of principle to look to extra-payroll-tax revenue since
the system has always been financed by contributions out of the wages of
those accruing benefits on those same earnings. Yet, as discussed earlier,
one of the longest standing, yet almost totally ignored, principles of Social
Security is the assumption of the drafters that general revenues would of
course be part of the long-term financing of the program.'93 In many ways,
that is the case already, given that income taxes imposed by the 1983
Amendments on Social Security benefits received by higher income
beneficiaries are earmarked for the Social Security trust funds to be used
for financing the program into the future.19 4
191. See generally McMahon, supra note 3 (discussing the increasing concentration of
income and wealth in the top 1% of the American population).
19 2. Id.
193. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text (showing the presumption by the
original drafters that general revenues would be needed).
194. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 121, 97 Stat. 65, 80-84.
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More importantly, most objections to using general revenues for Social
Security financing are based on a misapprehension that Social Security
benefits are tied to taxes or contributions so that infusing general revenues
into the program's financing would be some sort of violation of a "more
you pay, more you get" principle. On the contrary, as stated earlier,
benefit accrual under Social Security is based on the individual earnings
history, while payroll taxes are a financing source unconnected to benefits
actually paid.'95 The contributory principle is important and is more than
simply a symbol-it helps to create a direct commitment, a participatory
connection between worker and program in a way that a completely
general revenue financing system could not. If additional financing is
needed, however, it does not seem unreasonable to require additional
contributions from those at the top income levels who now reap a
significantly higher portion of the benefits of a relatively stable social system
for an aging population based largely on Social Security.
A more serious problem with decoupling the base for accrual of benefits
from the base for taxes is whether the contributory principle would be so
degraded that public support for Social Security-and tolerance of FICA
taxes-would substantially erode. Currently the public is largely unaware
of the degree to which general tax revenues already finance Social Security
and Medicare, and the strong feeling of ownership toward both programs,
exhibited as recently as in the protests against health care reform that
declared hostility to government-provided health care while at the same
time demanding protection for Medicare, may well be grounded primarily
in the belief that payroll taxes are the source of entitlement.
Of course, decoupling the tax base from the benefit-accrual base in no
way implies a change in the earnings basis of entitlement, and additional
financing from nonpayroll-tax sources would simply be an extension of
current nonpayroll-tax financing. The deeper issue is public perception,
which usually trumps reality and fact. If public support for Social Security
rests on the perception that each worker is contributing to her own
individual savings account that is drawn on in retirement, it might be
difficult to persuade the public that adding other revenues to payroll-tax
financing is consistent with an earnings-based entitlement. On the other
hand, there is very strong public support for increasing the wage-base limit
to address any revenue shortfall the system might experience,' 96 indicating
that American workers generally think higher income taxpayers are not
195. See supra notes 121-30 and accompanying text (discussing the erroneous notion of
Social Security as a system that returns benefits based on the amount of tax contributed).
196. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (providing polling data on citizen support
for an elimination of the tax cap).
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contributing their fair share to support Social Security.
Political considerations aside, a compelling argument can be made for
increasing the contributions of higher wage workers without commensurate
increases in benefits, and for either a wage tax or an income tax from the
perspective of the same fundamental notions of fairness and social benefit
that underlie the justification for progressive income taxation. It can be
argued that it is fair to tax higher income taxpayers at a higher marginal
rate on their top brackets of income, in part because they benefit to a
greater degree from social and economic structures and institutions. For
example, a surgeon earning $1 million in a year is able to make and keep
those earnings because of a host of public goods: police and fire protection,
courts to enforce property rights, public infrastructure, the military, and not
least, the Medicare program which makes it possible for many of her
patients to pay for her services. Because of her higher level of benefit from
those public goods, it is argued that it is not unreasonable for our surgeon
to pay a higher marginal rate on the top part of her income as recognition
of her greater degree of benefit from the protection of society.
This reasoning applies equally well to the benefits of Social Security
which extend far beyond individual benefits-Social Security's role in
stabilizing society and the economy by insuring a steady stream of income
at all income levels, maintaining demand, and providing retirees a stable set
of income expectations cannot be overstated. The "money's worth"
argument frequently used by critics of the program to attack its value to
high-wage workers ignores the value to the upper class of the enormous
social good of economic and social stability through the life cycle that
Social Security provides. It is therefore not unreasonable to ask them to
pay what might be thought of as a "stability premium" in the form of
higher payroll or income taxes to be used to insure Social Security's benefit
payments.
Ultimately, the issue of separating the benefit base from the tax base is a
question of philosophy rather than economics or tax theory. Americans are
unaccustomed to the notion that is widely accepted in most industrialized
countries: that people have a fundamental right, based not on work or taxes
or fees but on existence in the nation's jurisdiction, to basic welfare in the
form of at least minimal income support and access to health care. Most
Americans recognize the civic rights laid out in the Constitution to free
speech, voting, etc. as being inalienable for American citizens, but
economic and social welfare rights have always in the American system had
to be earned, paid for, or both. Social Security is based on that very
American notion that economic security in old age must be earned and
cannot be a "gift" from the government.
The conflation of the benefit and tax base limits, however, has allowed
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that "earned right" to be portrayed, particularly in recent years, as not so
much earned as "paid for"-paving the way for the last few decades of red
herring arguments about the "return on investment" that compared payroll
taxes paid in to benefits received. Correcting that erroneous framing to
restore the "earned" part of the earned-right principle is an enormous task.
Americans have become inured to having every public issue framed as a
question of narrow cost-benefit analysis and to looking at all public goods,
including the general welfare provided by government programs like Social
Security, as a question of narrow self-interest. When the issue of Social
Security financing is framed this way, it becomes extremely difficult to
increase the payroll-tax base limit without invoking cries of protest that
higher wage workers will get less than they ought to in benefits in exchange
for their tax payments. When the system is looked at correctly, however, as
a system in which benefits are earned, and the system as a whole is paid for
with direct contributions from workers and with other tax revenues as well,
the question of raising additional revenue immediately has multiple
answers, of which raising the taxable-wage-base limit is only one.
CONCLUSION
Tax policy analysts and commentators are reluctant to follow President
Obama through the new doughnut hole he has proposed for the Social
Security wage base for a variety of reasons both legitimate (tax avoidance
and gaming possibilities) and misplaced (violation of some basic Social
Security principle). I suggest in this Article that a clear analysis of the
proposal and alternatives should be grounded in a different way of looking
at the base and at the fundamentals of entitlement to benefits that are in
fact, rather than in fantasy, consistent with Social Security's core principles.
If we reframe the entitlement notion itself as one of earnings and work,
rather than payments and taxes, the entire question of Social Security
financing becomes infinitely more open to multiple answers, ranging from
changes in the tax base limit without changes in the benefit base to income-
tax surtaxes on higher income taxpayers.
Of course, there is no immediate need to do anything about Social
Security financing at all; on a trust fund reserve basis, it will most likely be
unnecessary to raise revenue for the OASDI cash-benefit system beyond
what is currently projected for at least two decades and possibly longer. 9 7
A detailed discussion of financing projections and the relationship between
dedicated tax financing and the trust-fund concept must wait for a follow-
up article, but clearly it makes little sense to increase the dedicated tax base
197. See generally 2009 BD. OFTRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 8.
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limit now to raise payroll-tax revenues that are not yet needed to pay for
current payments. That approach has been tried before-the 1983 Social
Security legislation put in place benefit reductions (including the increase in
the age for receipt of full benefits) and base and FICA tax rate changes that
were purposely designed to build up a large reserve through the 1990s and
the first decade of the 21st century, to be drawn on if and when yearly
revenues became insufficient to pay yearly benefits in the second quarter of
the new century.198 Now that we may be approaching the point of drawing
on those reserves by 2018 or earlier to make up yearly revenue shortfalls,
the trust-fund reserves are characterized by critics of Social Security as
"imaginary" and alarming cries that the system is "insolvent" pervade the
public commentary.
Despite a concerted campaign from conservative political and economic
analysts to assert that the trust fund does not exist, however, it is undeniably
true that American workers paid higher payroll taxes than necessary over
the last fifteen years in order to fund in advance the retirement of the baby
boom and later generations.' 9 9 Because the trust funds are held as special-
issue obligations of the U.S. Treasury, however, the practical effect of
surplus payroll-tax revenues over this period has been to finance the
general revenue deficit with regressive payroll-tax collections. Once the
trust-fund-bond reserves begin to be called upon to make up for yearly
revenue shortfalls, clearly income and other tax revenues will be under
more pressure to meet other government obligations. Nonetheless, the
political-economic obligation to pay Social Security benefits that are
earned over a working lifetime, regardless of the source of revenue, remains
in place, and the political reality of the trust-fund reserves made up of those
excess tax payments largely from baby-boom workers cannot be wished
away by those who would rather reduce benefit levels than increase income
taxes to repay general fund obligations to the Social Security trust funds.
The real utility of discussing changes to the wage-base limit now,
including the President's doughnut hole notion, is to begin to reframe
public and policymaker understanding of the real basis for Social Security
entitlement as I have laid out in this Article. By reimagining the Social
Security contribution and benefit base limit, we can free the analysis and
the policymakers from the straightjacket of regressive taxation as well as
198. See generally Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65.
199. See, e.g., COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 98TH CONG., AcTuARIAL COST ESTIMATES
OF THE EFFECTS OF PuBuc LAw 98-21 ON THE OLD-AGE, SLRVIVORS AND DisAmiury
LNSURANCE AND HOSPITAL PROGRAMS 22-23 (Comm. Print 1983) (showing the buildup in
trust-fund reserves because of the excess of payroll taxes collected over benefits being paid
out from the mid-1980s through 2020, with the corresponding decline in reserves
thereafter).
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from irrelevant arguments about rates of return on tax payments into the
system. This is not really either an economic or tax policy issue per se-it is
rather a question of properly understanding the peculiarly American
premise that those who work are entitled to dignified and meaningful
economic security. That premise has provided a sound, if not generous,
basis for economic and social stability: The future stability of the Social
Security benefit entitlement and of the revenue stream that funds those
benefits must rest on an accurate understanding and application of that
premise so that earned benefits can continue to be paid for by whatever
means necessary.
